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This thesis provides an analysis of the proposed and potential security fimctions of 
a United States National Missile Defense system and determines what implications the 
construction of such a system would have on current and future U.S.-Russian arms 
control agreements. This research is critical for understanding the evolution, both 
domestically and internationally, of ballistic missile defense systems and their link to 
nuclear strategy and arms control. This thesis will also explore the policy debates and 
political trends in both the United States and Russia concerning U.S. NMD, in an attempt 
to better explain each country’s position. 
Compromise between the two countries on arms control issues involving both 
offensive and defensive systems is only possible if post-Cold War realities are accepted. 
The current arms control regime that governs both offensive and defensive systems is 
based on a political and military reality that no longer exists. If the two former adversaries 
still desire to participate in bilateral arms control, the basis of that arms control needs to 
represent current realities, and change its focus from limitation and restriction to 
stewardship and inspection. 
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On January 20, 1999, Defense Secretary William Cohen announced that the 
United States would move forward in the development of an NMD system, touching off a 
new phase in an old debate. At issue is whether such a system would adequately provide 
defense for the fifty states against long-range missile threats posed by rogue nations, or 
whether it would simply restart the “arms race” and further injure relations with Russia. 
Those supporting NMD have argued that the limited NMD capability that the United 
States is developing is focused primarily on countering rogue nation threats and will not 
be capable of countering Russia’s nuclear deterrent. The Clinton administration decided 
to move ahead with funding necessary to pay for an NMD deployment, but went on to 
announce that no deployment decision would not be made before June 2000. This gave 
the administration the time needed to continue testing and clear any diplomatic hurdles. 
One such hurdle is the ABM Treaty. 
The administration prefers to maintain the ABM Treaty, which was originally 
concluded between the United States and the now defunct Soviet Union in 1972. At first 
glance, it is hard to see how a treaty designed to prevent a nationwide missile defense 
system can be amended to allow one, but the Clinton administration has argued that the 
limited NMJ) capabilities it envisions would not jeopardize Russia’s capacity to hold the 
United States at risk. In order for the United States to move forward on national missile 
defense and remain a party to the ABM Treaty, Russia must agree to the proposed treaty 
modification. 
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The challenge for the United States will be to design and deploy a limited 
national missile defense while at the same time easing Russian fears. The Russians are 
likely to continue to oppose any changes to the ABM Treaty that would allow the United 
States to move forward with NMD deployment or advanced TMD capabilities. If the 
United States hopes to be able to make a deployment decision by June 2000, it will need 
to find a compromise that eases Russian fears, or decide to exercise its legal right to 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The Clinton administration’s approach has been to 
link the ABM Treaty /NMD issue to hture arms control negotiations. The hope is that 
the Russians will allow the US.  to move forward with NMD if future missile reductions 
are made. This would allow the Russians to slim down an already aging arsenal, while at 
the same time keeping parity with the United States and remaining a nuclear superpower. 
The Clinton administration has not been able to successfully link the NMD/ABM 
treaty issue to future arms control and it appears that compromise is not possible. Even if 
the Russians were to agree to ABM Treaty modifications, it is doubtful that such an 
agreement would receive Senate approval. Many supporters of NMD, but critics of the 
Clinton administration’s policy, have argued that under such a linkage the United States 
would be leaving its fate against rogue state missiles up to the Russians. The 
administration’s argument that arms control is too important to simply throw away does 
indeed have validity, but any new arms control agreement should accurately represent the 
post-Cold War global security reality. If the intent of the administration and the arms 
control community is to maintain a bilateral treaty relationship with the Russians, it 
should not be done at the expense of national security. Any new arms control agreement 
should take into account that the Russians do not have the economic capability to engage 
X 
in an arms race and should be based on the premise that U.S. strategic weapons, or 
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This thesis describes the proposed and potential security functions of a United 
States National Missile Defense system and determines what implications the 
construction of such a system would have on U.S.-Russian arms control agreements. 
This research explores the link between ballistic missile defense systems and nuclear 
strategy and arms control. This thesis also will explore the policy debates and political 
trends in both the United States and Russia concerning U.S. NMD. 
A. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Defense against nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles has been at the center 
of the nuclear strategy and arms control debate since the end of World War 11. Once it 
was decided that the only defense against nuclear weapons would be defense against their 
delivery, defensive systems were constructed to target long-range bombers. The 
development and deployment of ballistic missiles able to deliver nuclear weapons soon 
made defense against strategic bombers a secondary concern. Both sides began to focus 
their defensive efforts on ballistic missiles, a much greater technological task than 
defending against manned bombers. Scientists and policy makers in both the United 
States and the Soviet Union struggled for years to estimate the utility of ballistic missile 
defense. 
Within the United States, some argue that a defensive system, in tandem with 
strong disarmament initiatives and arms control agreements, could end the offensive arms 
race and make the nuclear world stable. Others argued that defensive systems were 
needed because effective disarmament and realistic arms control would never be possible 
and only a strong defensive could deter an enemy preemptive strike. Still others saw no 
difference in offensive and defensive systems and viewed advances in both as dangerous 
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and destabilizing. At issue was the question of whether or not such systems actually 
protected their citizenry, or by increasing the incentive to create better offensive 
capabilities, only put them in greater danger. These concerns were the driving force 
behind arms control agreements that limited offensive and defensive capabilities. The 
main agreement that limited defensive capabilities was the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile 
Treaty, which some consider the “cornerstone” of offensive arms control agreements. 
Others argued that the offensive and defensive arms control agreements signed between 
the United States and the Soviet Union no longer represent post-Cold War security 
concerns and should be either amended or abandoned. 
Following the end of the Cold War, several new security challenges and dilemmas 
have again brought the issue of creating defensive systems to the forefront of U.S.- 
Russian relations. Because of the proliferation of nuclear capabilities and the spread of 
ballistic missile technology to “rogue nations,” the United States believes that its security 
might be threatened. In response to this threat, the United States again finds it necessary 
to explore the possibility of creating a national missile defense. 
On January 20, 1999, Defense Secretary William Cohen announced that the 
United States would develop an NMD system, touching off a new phase in this old 
debate. The program that has been endorsed by the Clinton administration develop a 
system that could be deployed by 2005 to protect the United States against a small 
number of attacking missiles.’ At issue is whether such a system would provide “defense 
for the fifty states against long-range missile threats posed by rogue  nation^,"^ or whether 
it would simply restart the “arms race” and further complicate U S .  relations with Russia. 
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The NMD policy debate within the United States is complicated. Those 
supporting NMD who still support the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty believe that the 
limited NMD capability that the United States is developing counters only “rogue nation” 
threats and cannot counter Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Some Republicans in both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate have criticized the Clinton administration for 
not developing more robust NMD. Republican critics believe that a series of incidents 
during 1998 highlighted emerging threats and may catalyze public support. In May 1998 
India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. In the summer of 1998, North Korea, 
Pakistan, and Iran tested new ballistic missiles that, while not able to reach the United 
States, demonstrated a growing sophistication in missile design. Opponents of missile 
defense point out that, even after 40 years, the United States has not been able to develop 
a “workable defensive missile ~ystem.”~ Aside from disputes over technological 
capabilities, NMD opponents argue that national missile defense provides no defense 
against attacks not delivered by ballistic mi~siles.~ 
The Clinton administration decided to move ahead with NMD funding, but went 
on to announce that no deployment decision would be made before June 2000. This gave 
the administration the time needed to continue testing and clear diplomatic hurdles to 
development. One such hurdle is the ABM Treaty. The Clinton administration maintains 
that the ABM Treaty is “the comerstone of strategic stability,” and the United States is 
committed to continued efforts to “strengthen the treaty and enhance its viability and 
effectiveness.”’ If the ABM Treaty is to be maintained as the cornerstone for existing 
and future arms reduction treaties, the challenge for the United States will be to design 
and deploy an effective national missile defense while easing Russian fears. 
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Two competing schools of strategic thinking are driving Russia’s national security 
policy debate. The traditionalist thinking “calls for the preservation of a strong emphasis 
on maintaining a military strategic balance with the United States” and relies upon 
existing bilateral agreements and treaties to maintain the status quo.6 Those who 
advocate a strict adherence to the ABM Treaty believe that any wavering on U.S. NMD 
would give the United States a strategic advantage. Traditionalists are convinced that the 
United States is determined to withdraw from the ABM treaty and move towards 
acquiring absolute protection from enemy missile attack. 
The other school recognizes “the virtual disappearance of the threat of American 
nuclear attack against Russia.”’ Proponents of this thinking, called “moderates” by Yuri 
Chkanikov and Andrei Shoumikhin, realize that parity is not possible.* Instead, they 
recommend that Russia strive towards a level of sufficiency, a force structure that would 
allow Russia to deliver unacceptable damage in a retaliatory   trike.^ These moderates 
share the same view as the traditionalists on the effects of U.S. national missile defense. 
Both suggest that the United States is masking its true goals. Both the traditionalists and 
the moderates remain perplexed by the Clinton administration’s calls for both 
maintaining the ABM Treaty, albeit with revisions, and pursuing development of a 
system for national missile defense against limited attacks. 
If U.S. officials intend to make a deployment decision by June 2000, they must 
find a compromise that eases Russian fears, or decide to exercise their legal right to 
withdraw from the ABM Treaty. The Clinton administration’s approach has been to link 
the ABM Treaty/NMD issue to future Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 
negotiations. The administration has indicated that it will not submit the September 1997 
4 
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ABM Treaty agreements to the U.S. Senate, which would change the ABM treaty from a 
bilateral U.S.-USSR accord to a multilateral treaty with five parties: the United States, 
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, nor will it begin formal START 111 
negotiations, until the Russians have ratified START 11. Now that the long ratification 
process of START I1 has finally been completed, the hope is that the Russians will allow 
the United States to move forward with NMD if future nuclear force reductions are 
codified in START 111. This would allow the Russians to slim down an already aging 
arsenal, while at the same time keeping parity with the United States and remaining a 
nuclear superpower. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE 
The data employed in this thesis is drawn from a qualitative analysis of primary 
sources, including Joint U.S.-USSR/Russian Statements, treaties, speeches, and 
interviews. It also draws upon a variety of secondary sources such as journalistic and 
scholarly analyses of core NMD and arms control issues. 
Chapter I1 of this thesis provides an overview of the evolution of the technology 
of defensive systems, as well as an analysis of the evolution of the policy regarding the 
development and deployment of these defenses. This chapter is meant to give the reader 
a basic understanding of the history of defensive systems and their relationship to arms 
control. The chapter will also discuss the evolution of the ABM Treaty and its place in 
offensive arms control. Chapter I11 is a review of the current United States policy debate 
over the deployment of a limited National Missile Defense. The position of the Clinton 
administration, House and Senate Republicans, and members of the arms control regime 
will be reviewed in depth in order to fully layout the complexities of the U.S. position. 
The fourth chapter will take a similar look at the strategic debate taking place in the 
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Russian Federation and will discuss Russia’s National Security Concept and the reasons 
that many Russians object to U.S. NMD proposals. Using the official policies and 
political opinions discussed in the third and fourth chapter as a basis, Chapter V will be a 
discussion of the possible effects that U.S. NMD could have on the future of START and 
the ABM Treaty. By analyzing the history of defensive policy, the current debates of the 
United States and Russia, as well as implications that U.S. NMD will have on arms 
control agreements, in chapter six the author will offer some observations on the future of 




EVOLUTION OF MISSILE DEFENSE DEBATE 
This chapter describes the history of the policy debate surrounding defensive 
systems, their relationship to offensive systems, and deterrence theory. First, it will 
examine many of the early national missile defense arguments and explain why NMD 
systems were seen as necessary and their relationship to offensive systems and arms 
control. Second, the events and policy debates leading up to the deployment of the first 
Antiballistic Missile systems, as well as those events that lead to the negotiation and 
signing of 1972 ABM Treaty, will be described. Finally, the revival of NMDBMD will 
be discussed and related to the ABM treaty, in order to provide the reader with a better 
understanding of the driving factors of the second NMD age and how the current debate 
has come about. The tenets of the treaty and agreed statements and protocols will also be 
discussed to clarify why second age NMD proposals require ABM Treaty modification. 
B. DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS 
In the 1940’s U.S. officials began to think about defense against atomic weapons. 
Initially, defense against nuclear weapons and defense against their delivery vehicles 
were seen as two different issues. Many people including President Hany Truman 
believed that defense against atomic weapons would soon be possible. In an October 23, 
1945, address, the President told Congress “every new weapon will eventually bring 
some counter defense to it.”” President Truman’s comment followed an earlier comment 
by Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, who also believed that atomic weapon defenses were 
possible. According to Admiral Nimitz it was a “historical truth” that “there has never 
yet been a weapon against which man has been unable to devise a counter weapon or 
defense.”’ ’ 
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1. Evolution of Theory and Policy 
When the experts concluded that there was no direct defense to the atomic bomb, 
the focus of strategic defense then shifted from defenses aimed at the bomb’s atomic 
composition to defenses that attacked the bomb’s delivery vehicle. l 2  Because ICBM’s 
were not yet viewed as a reliable delivery system, the ideas of missile defense and 
defense against air dropped nuclear weapons were pursued independently. With the 
lessons of World War I1 fresh in the minds of many of the United States strategic 
thinkers, it was believed that offensive delivery systems would have a decided advantage 
over defensive systems. American scientist Vannevar Bush and British scientist Patrick 
Blackett, however, argued that technological improvements in radar, jet engines, and 
missile guidance would improve the chances of locating, prosecuting, and destroying 
incoming manned bombers, which served as the first reliable nuclear weapon delivery 
~ehic1es.l~ Theorists, who believed in the primacy of the offense, argued that technology 
would affect both sides equally, allowing the offense to maintain its advantage. 
As the two sides debated their respective points of view, it became apparent that 
nuclear war was different than conventional war. In order to decrease the chance of 
catastrophic damage in nuclear conflicts, the defense would be required to destroy an 
extremely high percentage of the attacking nuclear delivery vehicles, giving the attacker a 
decisive advantage. It was believed that any major improvement in defensive technology 
would enhance the need for greater offensive capability, creating an offensive versus 
defensive a n n s  race 
While the United States was trying to decide on the utility of strategic defenses 
and their role in future disarmament or arms control, efforts to develop defenses against 
ballistic missiles were given low priority. This was because the full potential of the 
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fkture implications of ICBM’s as a nuclear delivery system was not yet realized. The 
idea of pursuing continental defense was initially advanced by two separate groups. One 
group advocated defensive systems as part of a larger package of arms control initiatives, 
while the second did not believe arms control would work and sought defensive systems 
as an added form of security. During the late years of the Truman administration and into 
the early years of President Eisenhower, the United States attempted to limit the 
expansion of nuclear weapons in both the United States and the Soviet Union and began 
to consider the possibility of bilateral arms control and disarmament initiatives. l 4  
President Truman tasked a group of leading American scientists and policy 
makers to investigate the possibility of limiting the growth of nuclear weapons in the 
hope of preventing fbrther destabilizing competition. The group was called the Panel of 
Consultants on Disarmament, which was chaired by J. Robert Oppenheimer and included 
such members as McGeorge Bundy and Allen Dulles. Out of their discussions came the 
thinking that defense strategies and arms control were “interlocked.”’ They believed 
that by emphasizing continental defense, the United States could demonstrate its interests 
in arms control. According to the Panel’s January 1953 report to Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, a stride towards continental defenses “cannot be read as an aggressive move, 
and it should constitute real evidence of the fact that we believe atomic weapons to be 
dangerous for all concerned.”16 Those who did not believe that a viable arms control 
agreement with the Soviets was possible also backed the idea of creating a continental 
defense. They believed such a defense was needed to blunt a Soviet surprise attack. 
According to a Department of State: Policy and Planning Staff Paper from November 
1952 authored by Paul Nitze and Carlton Savage, “an effective defense would be a 
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powerful deterrent to war; the enemy would be reluctant to strike if the blows would not 
be effective against us.”I7 
The Soviets were also giving great consideration to creating a defensive capability 
against nuclear delivery vehicles. In his book The Best Defense, David Goldfischer 
points out that although the Soviet receptivity to a combination of continental defense 
and anns control was never tested, “one can hardly assume that the Soviets would have 
rejected a serious U.S. proposal for a mutual defense emphasis (MDE.)”’* Goldfischer 
points out that despite the exaggerated American estimate of Soviet offensive 
capabilities, “it became increasingly clear that in their deployment policy the Soviets had 
in fact emphasized antiaircraft capabilities.”” The construction of an early warning radar 
system in 1946, and the later deployment of jet-powered MIG-15’s designed to intercept 
high altitude strategic bombers, displayed the Soviet’s emphasis on defense.20 This trend 
would continue, and in 1948 the Soviet Air Defenses became an independent branch of 
the armed services. Soviet Air Defenses employed a half million men, split between 
ground based antiaircraft artillery and airborne aircraft interception.2’ 
Soviet offensive technology developments, however, increased U.S. vulnerability. 
The widespread production of Soviet hydrogen bombs, deployment of the Soviet’s first 
intercontinental bomber, “Bear,” and the 1957 testing of an ICBM demonstrated to the 
United States that the Soviets were interested in pursuing offensive, as well as defensive, 
capabilities. A combination of the Russian experience, in which national survival 
required a robust homeland defense, coupled with little confidence in the technological 
capabilities of early generations of long range delivery systems and a recognition that the 
future of offensive weapons lay in the development of long range ICBM’s, might explain 
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Soviet posture.22 Had the United States decided to abandon its offensive advantage and 
adopt a strategic deployment process similar to that of the Soviets, perhaps both sides 
could have approached a credible defense-oriented deterrent posture.23 Such a security 
environment would have been close to Oppenheimer’s vision of the conditions necessary 
for a successful disarmament process to begin. Such conditions would allow both sides 
to feel secure that their opponent would not be able to conceal weapons in violation of 
disarmament agreements and hold the other side vulnerable. Oppenheimer believed that 
such an environment would yield a situation in which “steps of evasion will either be too 
vast to conceal or far too small to have in view of existing measures of defense, a 
decisive strategic effect.”24 Such an agreement would have required the Americans and 
Soviets to find a common interest in offensive disarmament. However, this was not the 
case and Oppenheimer’s vision was not realized. In fact, just the opposite of 
Oppenheimer’s vision would come true as the development and subsequent deployment 
of the ICBM as a nuclear delivery vehicle caused American and Soviet interests in 
offensive disarmament to become even more divergent. 
2. Creating an Antiballistic Missile System 
Even though the Americans were concerned about the deployment of Soviet long- 
range intercontinental bombers, they realized that, with their limited numbers and the 
limited likelihood that they would be able to pierce US.  defenses, the chance of a Soviet 
nuclear strike against the U.S. homeland was small. This would change on October 4, 
1957, as the launch of the of the Soviet Sputnik I, according to Lawrence Freedman, sent 
a message to the United States that it “no longer enjoyed invulnerability to the ravages of 
war.’725 Many Americans womed that the launch of Sputnik I signaled that the Soviets 
would be able to gain a decisive advantage over the United States in terms of nuclear 
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delivery capability. Both Soviets and Americans saw the utilization of ICBM’s as a 
means of gaining the upper hand in the new nuclear struggle and therefore both built 
them. 
The decision to deploy a new offensive weapon again raised the question about 
the possibility of developing defensives, an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system. 
Progress in developing long-range missiles, combined with evidence that the Soviets also 
were developing an ABM capability, motivated the United States to intensifL its efforts to 
develop missile defenses. America’s first anti-ballistic missile interceptor, the Nike- 
Zeus, emerged from the Nike program, an Army anti-aircraft missile. Even during the 
early days of the Nike-Zeus program it was not hlly decided whether ABM systems 
would be strategically beneficial or destabilizing. Two expert panels in the middle fifties 
addressed this issue; their findings were listed in each group’s respective report. 
The Killian Report, presented to the National Security Council (NSC) in February 
1955, saw little likelihood in defenses being adequate to permit survival against a full- 
scale attack.26 The Gaither Report was presented to the NSC in 1957. It diverged from 
the Killian Report on the likely technological capabilities of future ABM systems. The 
Gaither Report stated that dramatic improvements would be made in the quantity and 
quality of future ICBM’s, but also acknowledged the probability that technological 
advances would be made in detecting and defending against future missile attacks.27 It 
was concluded that “the missiles in turn will be made more sophisticated to avoid 
destruction; and there will be a continuing race between the offensive and the 
defen~ive.”~’ 
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During the late fifties and into middle sixties advances in missile and radar 
technology made it possible for the United States to begin fielding missile defenses. For 
the majority of the sixties, the Office of the Secretary of Defense studied many of the 
effects that deploying an ABM system could have on deterrence. There were several key 
events that led the U.S. officials to believe that unless they deployed a defensive system, 
they ran a serious risk of falling behind the Soviets. Perhaps the most notable event was 
the February 1967 announcement that the Soviet Union had begun to deploy the Galosh 
missile system around Moscow. According to Donald Baucom, the staff historian for the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Office, “if the Soviets continued, the United States also would 
have to field an ABM system or risk allowing the Soviets to create a dangerous 
asymmetry in superpower strategic force  posture^."^^ The United States had been 
considering three separate roles for an American ABM system.30 The first role was a 
system designed for a robust population defense against Soviet missiles. The second was 
a thin population defense set up clearly against Chinese rather than Soviet missiles, which 
also would offer protection against accidental launch. The third role was to protect 
ICBM fields, allowing the United States to maintain its second strike capability and 
deterring a Soviet first strike. 
The potentially destabilizing effects of an ABM system deployment were 
understood by the Johnson administration. The administration also realized what it 
would mean if the United States was not able to match Soviet defensive capabilities. In 
testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, Secretary of Defense 
McNamara laid out the administration’s plan for dealing with the effects of both 
scenarios. The plan was “to pursue with undiminished vigor the development, test, and 
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evaluation of the Nike-X system ... but to take no action now to deploy the ~ystem.”~‘ 
While the testing was taking place, McNamara told the committee that the administration 
planned “to initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union designed, through formal or 
informal agreement, to limit the deployment of antiballistic missile The main 
objective of these talks would be to keep the deployment of ABM systems down to a 
minimum, so as to prevent the evolution of first-strike capabilities and an arms race.33 In 
the event that these negotiations were unsuccessfbl, McNamara explained that “$375 
million has been included in the fiscal year 1968 budget to provide for such actions as 
may be required at that time.’y34 This plan provided President Johnson with the flexibility 
he needed to allow the United States to remain competitive in defensive systems, while 
seeking to limit their destabilizing potential. 
President Johnson and Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin met at Glassboro, New 
Jersey, in June 1967 to discuss the Johnson proposal to limit ABM systems along with a 
number of other arms control issues. Attempts to negotiate an agreement failed and on 
September 18, 1967, Secretary of Defense McNamara announced that the United States 
would deploy an ABM system that was oriented towards the Chinese threat. The new 
system was named the Sentinel missile defense system and was essentially the same as 
the Nike-X in configuration and design.35 Although the system was designed to defend 
against a smaller Chinese threat, it promised other benefits. The system, according to 
McNamara, would provide “further defense of our Minuteman sites against Soviet attack 
[and] protection of our population against . . .accidental launch of an intercontinental 
missile by any of the nuclear p o ~ e r s . ’ ’ ~ ~  This deployment plan retained a combination of 
the three ABM systems that the administration considered. 
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After his victory in 1968, President Richard Nixon initiated a review of U.S. 
strategic requirements and decided to modify President Johnson’s ABM decision. 
According to the Nixon administration’s assessment, ABM systems under the Johnson 
administration had been designed to “defend against an unsophisticated ICBM attack”37 
President Nixon refocused the U.S. missile defense deployment so that the system would 
primarily protect U.S. deterrent forces and renamed the ABM system “Safeguard.” In 
August of 1969, shortly after the Nixon administration had invited the Soviets to discuss 
limitations on strategic arms, by a narrow margin Congress approved the Safeguard 
deployment and the first ABM system began to deploy at Grand Forks, North Dakota. 
Soon after this decision in November 1969, the two sides began the first round of 
Strategic A r m s  Limitation Talks (SALT.) 
3. U.S.-Soviet Limitations on Defensive Systems 
During the early rounds of SALT, it became apparent that the Soviets were 
willing to limit ABM systems. It is not clear whether the change from previous Soviet 
views was based upon a recognition of the logic of the arguments advanced by the 
Americans at Glassboro in 1967 or a desire to curtail growing US. ABM capabilities. In 
this new round of ABM negotiations both sides proposed strict limits on ABM systems, 
but serious differences over offensive limitations emerged.38 When it appeared that these 
disagreements might delay the progress of the talks, the Soviets proposed that only a 
defensive agreement be reached and that offensive questions be left to later negotiations. 
The Americans did not accept this plan. They might have wanted to keep the issues 
undivided so that they could use their ongoing ABM deployments to gain concessions 
from the Soviets on offensive arms.39 American National Security Advisor Henry 
Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin, in a “back 
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channel negotiation,” were able to reach an agreement that produced the ABM Treaty of 
1972. The Treaty limited the United States and Soviet Union’s ability to deploy missile 
defenses capable of national defense. These treaty limitations combined with a number 
of technical limitations led Congress to close the Safeguard system in early 1976, only a 
few months after it had become operational. 
4. Re-emergence of Need for U.S. ABM System 
From the 1976 until 1983, the United States continued working on advanced 
research and development for missile defense systems. While the United States was 
continuing to improve ABM sensor and interceptor technology, the Soviets were 
improving their offensive missile capabilities. In the 1970s the Soviets succeeded in 
reducing the circular error probable (CEP) of there missile from one half mile down to 
one sixth of a mile.40 Along with improved accuracy the Soviets used multiple 
independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology to increase their number of warheads 
from 2400 to 6000, 3000 of which were accurate enough “to constitute a threat” to U.S. 
silo-based ICBM’s.41 This situation led the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in February 1983, to 
recommend to President Ronald Reagan that the United States begin to place greater 
emphasis in its strategic plans on developing missile defense systems. 
a. SDI 
Having come to office favorably disposed towards strategic defenses, 
President Reagan was highly receptive to the Joint Chiefs recommendation. On March 
23, 1983, in a nationally televised speech, the President announced his decision to initiate 
expanded research and development to see if strategic defenses were feasible. According 
to Reagan, his goal would be to create a defense so comprehensive that it would render 
“nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.’’ Following a year of technical and strategic 
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studies on how best to pursue the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI,) the 
Defense Department established the SDI Organization in April 1984. After two and a 
half years of research and development, the President and Secretary of Defense entered a 
missile defense system into the defense acquisition process. In September 1987, 
Strategic Defense System (SDS) Phase I Architecture was approved. This architecture 
was comprised of six subsystems and provided a structure to guide hrther refinement of 
missile defense components. The most significant change in the approved SDS 
architecture came in 1989 with the replacement of the space-based interceptor (SBI) with 
an interceptor concept known as Brilliant Pebbles. This change allowed the system’s 
space component to shrink in size and increase in numbers. This made the space based 
“Brilliant Pebbles” harder to target and therefore less vulnerable than the large SBI’s. 42 
By the time the “Brilliant Pebbles” concept was accepted, the strategic 
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States had begun to change. In 
December 1989 East Germany opened the Berlin Wall, and, in light of this thawing in 
East and West relations, the Bush administration in late 1989 initiated a review of the 
SDI program. The review was conducted by Ambassador Henry Cooper, an experienced 
strategic and space systems engineer and an American negotiator at the Defense and 
Space Talks. Ambassador Cooper found that, as a result of tensions in the Soviet Union 
and the proliferation of missile technology, the most significant threat to the United 
States would be from an unauthorized or terrorist attack. To prepare for these new 
threats, Cooper suggested that the SDI program be transformed to concentrate on 
developing defenses against limited attacks rather than preparing for an attack by 
thousands of Soviet warheads. 
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b. Shifr from Countering a Soviet Threat to Global Protection 
In his January 1991 State of the Union address, President George Bush 
announced that the Defense Department was refocusing the SDI program from defending 
against a massive Soviet attack to a system known as GPALS, “Global Protection 
Against Limited Strikes.” President Bush explained that the new system would provide 
“protection from limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source.”43 The new 
system contained three main components: a ground-based National Missile Defense 
(NMD,) a ground Theater Missile Defense (TMD,) and a Space-Based Global Defense. 
GPALS clearly reflected an increased emphasis on missile threats against deployed 
American forces, a threat that was displayed when Saddam Hussein used SCUD missiles 
to attack U.S. allies. By passing the Missile Defense Act of 1991, Congress went on 
record as supporting the idea of deploying a U.S. missile defense aimed against limited 
missile threats. After receiving congressional support, President Bush shared the GPALS 
idea with the Russians, who, in the form of a joint statement signed by Presidents Bush 
and Yeltsin, agreed to cooperate in the development for a larger Global Protection 
System. The hope of possible cooperation between the Americans and Russians would 
continue on into the Clinton administration. 
c. Transition from GPALS to Countering Rogue Threats 
In May of 1993, newly appointed Defense Secretary Les Aspin announced 
that the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization was being renamed the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization. This renaming displayed the transformation that was taking place 
from an emphasis on national protection against a Cold War type missile attack to the 
missile threats that arose during the Gulf War. For the Clinton administration’s first three 
years, it concentrated the bulk of the BMDO’s effort on the creation of a TMD system to 
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protect deployed American troops and interests. The NMD program was given second 
priority and considerably less funding. The administration’s NMD plan outlined in the 
Bottom Up Review (BUR) called for limited funding for NMD, preparing for the “time 
when it might be necessary to quickly deploy defenses for the U.S. homeland.”44 
In early 1996, because of the “emerging threat from longer-range theater 
missiles”45 and a ‘‘future threat that undeterable rogue states will obtain ICBM’s that can 
reach the Unites States,”46 the administration decided to increase efforts to create a 
missile defense that could protect the U.S. homeland. In an April 1996 speech at George 
Washington University, Defense Secretary Perry outlined why a change in policy was 
necessary. He stated that “while the United States is safe today from strategic missile 
attack, this picture could In his speech he acknowledged that some in 
Congress had begun calling for the administration “to speed up and spend more” on 
systems to handle future threats, but felt it important not to sacrifice TMD and ignore the 
present threats facing U.S. forces. Secretary Perry commented “as we develop these 
systems [TMD and NMD] . . .in a world where financial priorities must be set, we believe 
the highest priority should be given to developing and deploying defenses against the 
missile threat that is here today.” 
This thinking was the force behind the Clinton administration’s new plan 
for missile defense. In the hopes of updating existing TMD systems and battling the 
“here and now threat,” new TMD efforts would be given top priority. The new plan for 
NMD was known as the “three-plus-three plan”. It called for the BMDO to support three 
more years of ,developmental work leading to a systems integration test in 1999. 
Following this test the United States would be able to field a national missile defense in 
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three more years, if the threat warranted such a deployment. If deployment was not 
warranted, the BMDO would continued to make improvements on the existing systems 
under development, but would always be able to deploy a system in three years following 
any decision to deploy. 
To manage this new NMD policy, the BMDO was directed to establish a 
Joint Program Office (JPO,) which was activated in April 1997. The role of the new JPO 
was to oversee the selection of a contractor to ensure the integration of components 
developed by military services into an effective NMD system.48 As the program 
progressed, the administration began briefing Congress and the American people about 
the mission for this new system. According to former Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition Paul Kaminski, the primary mission of NMD was to develop a capacity to 
“defend the United States homeland - the continental U.S., Hawaii and Alaska - against 
limited strategic ballistic missile attack by a rogue nation.”49 In addition, such a system 
would have some capacity against a small accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic 
ballistic missile fired fiom “more nuclear capable states.”50 
C. THE ABM TREATY AND NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE 
1. ABM Treaty Specifics 
The purpose of the ABM Treaty, as explained in Article 1, is to prohibit the 
deployment of an ABM system for “the defense of the territory or provision of a base for 
such defense.” Originally, the treaty limited the two parties to two ABM deployment 
areas, but the 1974 protocol to the ABM Treaty further reduced the number to one site 
each. Each side’s site is limited to a deployment area with a radius of no more than 150 
kilometers from either the country’s national command authority or an ICBM launch 
area. Precise quantitative and qualitative limits are imposed on the ABM systems that 
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may be deployed, each site is limited to no more than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 
launchers. The technical restrictions placed on radar systems were not spelled out in the 
treaty. After the treaty’s completion, however, the two sides were able to reach 
agreement and the provisions governing these components are detailed in the “Agreed 
Statements’’ that accompany the treaty. 
The Treaty also addressed future issues. To decrease the pressures of 
technological change that might have an unsettling impact, both sides agreed “not to 
develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components, which are sea-based, space-based, 
or mobile land based.”51 Should future technology bring forth new ABM systems, other 
than those employed in current systems, it was agreed that limiting these new systems 
would be discussed. The Treaty provided for a U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative 
Commission to promote the treaty’s objectives and its implementation. Future issues that 
might arise concerning new technology or treaty eaforcement are reviewed at five-year 
intervals. 
The major compliance issues that have been addressed by the comission have 
involved incidents that stem from one side’s belief that the other is pushing the treaty’s 
technological or deployment limits. Such an incident occurred in the mid-eighties, when 
the Americans questioned the purpose of Soviet radar near Kransnoyarsk. The Soviets 
later admitted that the radar was “a violation of the ABM Treaty” and decided it would be 
d i~mant led .~~ The Soviets also have used standing committee sessions to question US.  
capabilities. In response to the Krasnoyarsk issue, the Soviets raised questions regarding 
U.S. radar at Thule, Greenland, and Flyingdales Moor, United Kingdom, contending that 
these systems where in violation of portions of the Agreed Staternent~.~~ 
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2. Problems with Missile Defense Plans 
Throughout the treaty’s first decade in existence, few concerns were raised and 
the treaty appeared to be achieving its goal. This relative harmony lasted until the mid- 
nineteen eighties, when the first phase of the SDI program began to blossom. From the 
beginning, SDI was bound up with the future of arms control.54 As long as the guidelines 
and stipulations of the ABM treaty were followed, it appeared that SDI would not be able 
to progress very far. The first phase of SDI sparked the beginning of an intense debate 
over the interpretation of the ABM Treaty as it applied to the SDI program. At the heart 
of the debate was the interpretation of passages in the treaty pertaining to futuristic 
systems that were based on technologies not used in the components and systems 
regulated by the AI3M Treaty.” Supporters of a broad interpretation of the treaty argued 
that the treaty anticipated development of futuristic systems and did restrain research and 
development of more sophisticated systems. Advocates of a strict interpretation of the 
treaty disagreed and held that the treaty prohibited the development, testing, and 
deployment of all systems except fixed land based ABM systems, regardless of the 
technologies they were based on. This debate continued throughout the remaining years 
of the Cold War and was never re~olved.’~ 
Even though President Bush’s refocusing of U.S. missile defense priorities 
calmed many of the Soviet fears, the GPALS concept still had several ABM Treaty 
implications. According to the treaty, the GPALS system could never be deployed. In 
the early nineties there were some hopes that maybe the Soviet Union would be willing to 
amend the ABM Treaty to allow both sides to deploy defenses against limited  threat^.'^ 
Despite the “spate of Soviet articles and statements” endorsing mutual missile defense 
against Third Party threats, the official position of the Soviet Union remained in 
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opposition to expanded BMD.” For the time following the Soviet collapse, it appeared 
that some sort of agreement on a cooperative system and modifying the ABM Treaty 
might be reached. The Russians believed that such a system could be constructed outside 
of, but consistent with, the ABM Treaty.jg Russian willingness to work outside of the 
AE3M Treaty changed as U.S.-Russian relations soured. Russia was only willing to allow 
the United States to pursue systems that were sanctioned by the treaty and its agreed 
protocols. 
3. Updating the ABM Treaty 
As the capability of TMD systems increased, arms control advocates began to 
raise questions about the relationship of advanced TMD to the ABM Treaty, even though 
TMD had not been specifically covered by the 1972 agreement or in subsequent reviews. 
In response to this problem, the Clinton administration began negotiations with Russia 
and the three former Soviet republics “to develop a set of demarcation guidelines that 
would preserve the integrity of the ABM Treaty”6o by distinguishing TMD from NMD. 
Seven agreements affecting the ABM Treaty were signed or issued by representatives of 
the United States, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan in September 1997. These 
agreements would change the ABM treaty from a bilateral U.S.-USSR accord to a 
multilateral treaty with five parties: the United States, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and 
Kazakhstan. The agreements also would extend the treaty’s coverage to include theater 
missile defense and speed limitations on interceptor missiles. These new measures 
allowed the treaty’s parties to develop TMD systems as long as they could not intercept 
strategic missile warheads. 
Many Congressional Republicans opposed the administration’s arms control 
policy. They believed that the demarcation guidelines would impose undue limitations 
23 
on the TMD systems that the United States was currently developing. Furthermore, the 
Republicans advocated changing the ABM Treaty to allow more latitude for the 
development of limited NMD systems. Much of the current U.S. policy debate 
concerning NMD centers on the ABM Treaty. 
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111. U. S. POLICY DEBATE 
The domestic NMD policy debate has centered on the views of three major 
groups. The Clinton administration has led the charge for those calling for a limited 
NMD system while at the same timing insisting that the principles of the ABM Treaty be 
preserved. Congressional Republicans and their supporters have advocated moving 
towards immediate deployment of a limited NMD system and are willing to sacrifice 
what they believe to be an outdated and irrelevant ABM Treaty. Leading the opposition 
against all forms of NMD and calling for the preservation of the ABM Treaty have been 
members of the arms control community. 
A. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION 
The Clinton administration has argued that the limited NMD capability that the 
United States is developing is focused primarily on countering “rogue nation” threats and 
will not be capable of countering Russia’s nuclear deterrent. According to the President, 
the United States is “committed to meeting the growing danger that outlaw nations will 
develop and deploy long-range missiles that could deliver weapons of mass 
destruction.”61 President Clinton has announced that he will make an NMD deployment 
decision in June 2000, based on the results of flight tests and other developmental efforts, 
cost estimates, threat evaluation, and a review of arms control objectives. 
1. Criteria for making a Deployment Decision 
a Funding 
Defense Secretary Cohen outlined the administration’s program for 
handling NMD development, deployment, and associated political and diplomatic issues 
in a January 20, 1999, speech at the Pentagon. Secretary Cohen prefaced his remarks by 
stating that the administration had reached “four critical decisions” with regard to the 
national missile defense program. The first decision was that more funds would be 
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budgeted in the current and future defense budgets to pay for a possible NMD 
deployment. The Secretary acknowledged that national missile defense has been a long I 
standing project of the Defense Department, but stated that “until now the DoD has not 
budgeted any funds to support a possible deployment.”62 
b. Assessment of the Threat 
Second, citing the results of the “Commission to Assess the Ballistic 
Missile Threat to the United States,” led by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfield, 
Mr. Cohen acknowledged that a current ballistic missile threat existed and would only 
increase with time. According to the Commission’s July 15, 1998, Executive Summary, 
“concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic 
missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States.”63 
Secretary Cohen called the findings of the Rumsfield Commission “a sobering analysis of 
the nature of the threat.”@ This finding was important in order for the administration to 
justify moving along in their deployment readiness program. This program has two key 
criteria that must be satisfied before a deployment decision can be made. There must be 
a threat present, and the technology needed to proceed with deployment must be 
sufficiently developed. 
c. Arms Control Issues 
The third NMD decision concerns the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. 
On several occasions officials in the administration, including the President himself, have 
underscored the importance of moving forward with limited NMD while at the same time 
“maintaining the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic ~tabi l i ty .”~~ The 
administration has tried to make this point clear both to members of Congress and the 
international community. In a February 24, 1999, appearance before the Senate Foreign 
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Relations Committee, Secretary of State Madeline Albright testified that “a decision 
regarding NMD deployment must also be addressed within the context of the ABM 
Treaty.’766 Secretary Albright also assured the committee members that she “made it 
clear to Russian leaders that deployment of a limited NMD that required amendments to 
the AE3M Treaty would not be incompatible with the underlying principles of that 
Treaty.”67 
At present the United States NMD policy is being conducted within the 
terms of the ABM Treaty.68 Modifications to the Treaty, however, will be needed if the 
President chooses to move forward with an NMD deployment. Undersecretary of State 
for A r m s  Control and International Security Affairs John Holum has taken the position 
that it is possible to design a limited national missile defense that would not interfere with 
the basic principles of the ABM Treaty. The Undersecretary further believes that the 
ABM Treaty is a “flexible, living document that should be susceptible to modification as 
the international environment changes.”69 He believes that just as the ABM Treaty was 
modified “in the case of demarcation between theater and national missile defense,” it 
can be changed “to accommodate this new concern.”70 
d. Deployment Date 
The fourth NMD decision reached by the administration was to delay the 
projected deployment date until 2005. The change fiom a 2003 date is designed “to 
maximize the probability of programmatic success and to be able to deploy a 
technologically capable system as quickly as p~ssible.”~’ This shift is in response to 
concern that the program is moving ahead too quickly and is not allowing enough time 
for a thorough testing process to take place. Many of these concerns were outlined in a 
June 1998 General Accounting Office report entitled “National Missile Defense: Even 
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with Increased Funding Technical and Schedule Risks are High.” Completed when the 
DoD projected NMD deployment date was still 2003, it wams that “technical risks I 
remain high for a fiscal year 2003 deployment even though the program has made 
technical progress.”72 This additional time will allow testing to be completed and prevent 
the program from “rushing to failure.” 
2. European Response 
It appears that assurances from Clinton administration officials may not have been 
enough for either the Russians or for America’s European allies. The European allies 
have used the ABM Treaty modification issue as an opening to interject their opinions on 
what originally began as a domestic political and bilateral international question. France, 
Germany, Norway, Denmark, and Great Britain have expressed concern over the United 
States plans to modify the ABM Treaty and move ahead with NMD. The fears and 
concerns of America’s European allies could be a major factor affecting President 
Clinton’s decision on whether or not to move ahead with NMD. The allies fear that US.  
NMD could weaken the political and military links between the United States and Europe 
and re-ignite a global arms race. 
Many European allies, notably Germany and France, believe that the United 
States is exaggerating the threat posed by rogue states and view the plan as destabilizing. 
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer commented that “there is no doubt that this 
would lead to split security standards within the NATO alliance.”73 French officials have 
been equally vocal about their concerns, warning that such policies could “open a 
Pandora’s box that is in none of the allies’ interest.”74 In an October 1999 speech to the 
French National Institute for Higher Defense Leaming, French Premiere Lionel Jospin 
expressed many of the French concerns about U.S. proposals to amend the ABM Treaty 
28 
and move ahead with NMD. Premier Jospin warned of the creation of a new arms race, 
the slowing of the international arm control process, and the French “fear” regarding the 
development of antimissile defense programs.75 Even though the French Premier 
conceded that the 1972 ABM Treaty was a bilateral agreement, he stated that “it is clear 
that this question cannot be dealt with solely within the bilateral Russian-U.S. 
f r a rne~ork . ”~~  According to a March 2000 article by Therese Delpech published in 
Disarmament Diplomacy; French concerns go beyond NATO and arms control. 
Delpech, although not officially presenting the position of the French government, 
offers a unique perspective that the Clinton administration will need to consider when 
making an NMD deployment decision. Delpech questions the effectiveness of the 
proposed US. system, its justification, and finally, the strategic vision of the United 
States in utilizing such a system.77 Although highly critical of the United States, the 
article raises some crucial points that are important when considering the European 
position. Delpech points out that Europeans, unlike Americans, believe that vulnerability 
is a “normal condition,” and that being vulnerable has “always be part of their daily 
 live^."^' She also points out that the Europeans fear “de-coupling” at the same time that 
they fear too much American interference in their own affairs.79 The German Foreign 
Minister also has expressed his concern that America will be less likely to defend 
European security if there is not equal vulnerability among potential US.  and European 
targets. The third European issue that should be an American concern is the perception 
among “more than one European leader,” that, when dealing with strategic problems, 
there is a growing trend in the United States to replace “negotiations and multilateral 
regulating instruments” with “technological solutions.”” 
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Perhaps more important and of greater concern to President Clinton than the 
objections of France and Germany, will be the hesitation, and in some cases outright 
objections, on the part of Great Britain concerning the United States proposed ABM 
treaty and NMD plan. Recent statements made by Great Britain’s top officials and 
articles in the British press have both displayed a possible reluctance on the part of Great 
Britain to support the American initiative. There is fear in Britain that if the United 
States is allowed to upgrade its early warning radar site at Flyingdales in North 
Yorkshire, in order to aid in the tracking and destroying of enemy missiles, Britain could 
risk becoming the target of rogue states reprisals. Although the Blair government has not 
formally rejected U S .  proposals to use the existing site as part of a U.S. NMD system, it 
has not been as supportive as some Americans would like. Traditionally America has 
looked to Great Britain as its champion in Europe, serving as an advocate of American 
policies to the other European allies. In fact, in a recent interview, British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair described Britain’s role in the Anglo-American relationship as helping 
“Europe understand where America is coming from.’78’ 
Blair appears to be tom between being an advocate of U.S. policies in Europe and 
being an advocate of British and European national security concerns. Recent statements 
by the Prime Mister on the ABM Treaty and U.S. NMD issues are examples of this 
dilemma. Blair has been quoted as saying that “there is an understanding ... as to the 
threat the United States perceives and why it wants to take action,” but also points out 
that “many people are very anxious to see the ABM Treaty maintained.”82 According to 
the British press there is a fear in Britain that “a US.  national antimissile system, which 
would require an amendment to the ABM Treaty.. .would unleash a new arms race.”83 
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Until the British position is clarified, it will be difficult for the Clinton administration to 
gauge what the effect of pursuing NMD will have on the Anglo-American alliance. 
There has been speculation that the US. missile shield should be shared with the British 
and other European allies, but the cost of such a plan and its effects on a future arms race 
have prevented any serious plans from being proposed.84 
The trans-Atlantic disagreements over the ABM treaty and the importance of 
missile defense reflect a difference in perception between the Europeans and the 
Americans. Even if in the end both sides agree to disagree on A B W D  issues, an 
amicable settlement must be reached to prevent compromising NATO effectiveness. 
According to David Gompert, former senior director of the National Security Council and 
now President of RAND Europe, "this trans-Atlantic schism could turn fatal to the 
alliance in the event of a violent conflict with a rogue state armed with weapons of mass 
destruction.7y85 Because so much is at stake, the issue of ABM Treaty compliance no 
longer just involves Republican versus Democrat Congressional debates or U.S. versus 
Russia arms control negotiations for the Clinton administration, it now takes on the 
importance of all U.S. interests in Europe as well. 
B. CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS 
In June 2000, the Clinton administration will be forced to weigh all of the factors 
involved and decided whether or not to deploy a limited NMD system. Some 
Republicans in both the House of Representatives and the Senate have criticized the 
administration for not pursuing a more robust NMD system. Republican efforts to force 
the Clinton administration to deploy a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles has 
been a key tenet in their defense policy since the party took control of Congress in 1995. 
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In February 1995, the Republicans brought to the House floor H.R.7, the national 
security portion of the of their “Contract With America.” The Republicans pledged to 
deploy both a national missile defense as well as theater missile defense systems “as soon 
as practical.”86 In the House of Representatives, Republicans have had a difficult time 
getting their national defense plan through. In the 1995 debate, other portions of the 
Republican defense policy easily passed through Congress while their NMD deployment 
plan was defeated. The only victory that the House Republicans could claim was that 
they added increased NMD funding to future defense budgets. 
On the Senate side, Republicans in the Senate Armed Services Committee united 
in support of the “Missile Defense Act of 1995.” This was a twenty-page portion of the 
fiscal 1996 Defense Authorization bill that announced that it was U.S. policy to deploy 
multiple-site missile defenses by 2003. Along with strengthening the Act’s language, 
they also increased funding for theater and national missile defenses. An amendment of 
note, offered on the Senate floor by Senator William Cohen (R-ME,) expressed the sense 
of Congress that a multi-site deployment policy could be carried out through means 
consistent with the ABM Treaty, and urged negotiations with Russia to modify the 
Treaty. This amendment, along with subsequent bipartisan negotiation, allowed the bill 
to pass 85-13. Even though the bill’s language was changed, many Senate Republicans 
viewed it as a victory. Senator Strom Thunnund (R-SC,) after the bills passing, 
commented “we are clearly on the path to developing a multi-site NMD 
After the bill passed in the Senate, a conference committee was convened to iron 
out the differences in the legislation between the two chambers. The committee 
increased the funding for ballistic missile defense and required the Pentagon to deploy a 
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NMD system capable of protecting all fifty states by the year 2003. Both chambers 
approved the conference report and the bill was sent to the President. Citing that the 
missile defense provision would jeopardize the START agreements, the President vetoed 
the bill. In January 1996 a new conference report, which left out the NMD mandate, was 
submitted, and the President signed the new report into law on February 10, 1996.” 
During 1996 and 1997, the Republican-led Congress and the administration 
compromised on ballistic missile defense issues. Funds were added to the administration 
BMD budget requests, but no new language mandating an NMD deployment was 
introduced. At times Republican leaders threatened to introduce NMD legislation and 
move forward with a 2003 deployment mandate, but they never acted on their threats. 
The president’s Republican critics believe that a series of incidents during 1998 
highlighted emerging threats and may catalyze public support for NMD. In May 1998, 
India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. In the summer of 1998, North Korea, 
Pakistan, and Iran tested new ballistic missiles that, while not able to reach North 
America, demonstrated a growing sophistication in missile design. In spite of the Clinton 
administration’s January 20, 1999, announcement, Congress, led by the Republican 
leadership and pro-defense Democrats, moved forward with their own plan for ensuring 
NMD deployment. 
On February 4, 1999, Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA) held a news conference 
to announce what he called a bipartisan congressional effort to commit the United States 
“to deploy a national missile defense system.”89 The congressman pledged that 1999 
would be the year in which Congress would act on an NMD deployment mandate and 
send a clear message to the country’s “rogue threats.’’ He announced that this 
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“commitment sends a clear message to countries like North Korea that we are not going 
to be held hostage.’”’ The Congressional Republican push for an NMD deployment was 
also carried out by the Senate Republicans. 
In a February 24, 1999, letter to President Clinton, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC,) 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asked that the President provide 
evidence to contradict the contention of Republicans that the 1972 ABM Treaty is 
rnorib~nd.~’ This letter followed up a January 22, 1999, Opinion Editorial in the Wall 
Street Journal. In this editorial Senator Helms opined that “we do not need to renegotiate 
the ABM Treaty to build and deploy national missile defense.. .we can do it today.. .the 
ABM Treaty is dead ... it died when our treaty partner, the Soviet Union, ceased to 
exist.”92 Senator Helms contends that since the President has not submitted the new 
protocols, which would expand the ABM Treaty to include Russia and the other post- 
Soviet states, to the Senate for its advice and consent, the United States is not bound by 
the Cold War treaty. Accompanying his letter to the President, Senator Helms included a 
memorandum prepared by attorneys George Micron and Douglas Feith for the 
Washington-based Center for Security Policy, which reinforces the Senator’s claim that 
the ABM Treaty died with the demise of the Soviet Union.93 
Both Congressman Weldon and Senator Helms were instrumental in the events 
that followed over the next several months. On the same day that Senator Helms sent his 
letter to the President, by a vote of fifty to three, the House Armed Services Committee 
approved a measure cosponsored by Congressman Weldon that declared it a goal of the 
U.S. to deploy national missile defenses. A little over two weeks later, the Senate voted 
97 to 3 to commit the United States to deploy a national anti-missile defense system. The 
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next day the House followed suit and, by a vote of 3 17 to 105, approved the Weldon Bill. 
Both bills went through conference committee and the final version, which included 
softer language than the original Weldon Bill, was sent to the President for his 
consideration. On June 29, 1999, President Clinton signed the National Missile Defense 
Act making it policy to deploy an NMD system as soon as technologically feasible. Even 
though the bill signed into law included weaker language and called for continued arms 
control talks with the Russians, the Republicans had succeeded where they had failed in 
1995. They had forced President Clinton to sign into law a commitment to national 
missile defense. 
Perhaps the best explanation of the Republican rationale for pushing forward with 
limited NMD and for questioning the validity of the ABM Treaty comes from Senator 
Thad Cochran (R-MS), co-sponsor of the Senate NMD bill. In a March 25, 1999, 
breakfast speech focused on NMD and sponsored by the National Defense University, 
Senator Cochran said that a final deployment decision “should be taken with speed and 
with system effectiveness in mind.”94 In his speech he recognized that since “each Party 
undertakes not to deploy systems for a defense of the temtory of its country, there are 
obvious conflicts between the ABM Treaty and an NMD deployment. 7’95 The Senator 
went on say that the ABM Treaty is a companion to the arms limitation and reduction 
treaties, and, while each of these processes has evolved over the years, “the ABM Treaty 
had never been updated.”96 Congressional Republicans and their supporters believe that 
the United States should not delay deploying national missile defense. They believe that 
the Russians should be pushed to make the needed changes in the treaty to reflect the 
changes in the international security environment. In the event that no compromise can 
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be reached, according to Senator Helms, the United States should “toss it into the dustbin 
of history and thereby clear the way to build national missile defen~e.”~’ 
C. POSITION OF THOSE OPPOSING NMD 
The limited support of the Clinton administration for NMD and the pro-NMD 
position of the Republicans have caused concern within the arms control community. 
The arms control establishment opposes the deployment of a limited NMD system 
because it demands a change to the 1972 ABM Treaty. They believe that the ABM 
Treaty is necessary for achieving deeper nuclear arms reduction. If Russia believes that 
its nuclear forces will be overwhelmed by ballistic missile defenses, “it will be less likely 
to reduce those forces.’’98 So long as Russians believe that they have the ability to 
achieve “acceptable damage,” they probably will be more inclined to cut their nuclear 
warheads. National Security advisor Sandy Berger underscored this point when he 
commented that “there is no reason to believe that Russian political and military leaders 
will agree to sharply reduce strategic nuclear missiles in the absence of the ABM Treaty’s 
 constraint^."^^ Those opposed to NMD rebuff the idea that the ABM Treaty has outlived 
its usefulness. Jack Mendelson, a member of the A r m s  Control Association, for example, 
has written “the ABM Treaty’s constraints on major anti-ballistic missile defensive 
deployments continue to be a key element in the willingness of the US. and Russia to 
accept significant reductions in their offensive forces.’71oo 
Opponents of missile defense believe that the key technical problems remain with 
national defenses, pointing out that even after 40 years the United States has not been 
able to develop a “workable defensive missile system.”1o’ They argue that recent testing 
of missile defenses has not yielded the appropriate successes to warrant moving forward 
with NMD deployment. John Issacs, President of the Council for a Livable World, 
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believes that “nobody can prove for sure that this technology works, just hitting a bullet 
with a bullet is very different from developing a workable defense shield.””* Mr. Isaacs 
further believes that “hitting a missile fired from Kwajalein missile range, when you 
know when its fired and where its fired, is very different than trying to anticipate a 
missile launch form Russia, China, or North Korea. According to John Pike, director of 
space policy at the Federation of America Scientists, “in 1972 we signed the Anti- 
Ballistic Missile Treaty in recognition of our inability to construct workable anti-missile 
systems” and “we are no closer to a workable system 
NMD, opponents also argue that NMD would provide no defense against likely 
attacks on the United States. They argue that the likely methods of delivery have already 
been demonstrated at the World Trade Center in New York, the Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City, and the subway system in Tokyo. National leaders, including Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Harry Shelton, have recognized such threats. In an 
interview with Sea Power Magazine, General Shelton acknowledged that “there are other 
serious threats out there in addition to that posed by ballistic missiles.”’04 There is a 
common fear among those in opposition to NMD that national defenses will only provide 
the American people with a false sense of security. Long-range missiles are more 
expensive and technically difficult to build and deploy than other delivery means. 
According to Isaacs, aside from the initial costs and deployment difficulties there are 
many reasons that another country is not gong to attack the U.S. with missiles, the most 
prominent being their fear of U.S. nuclear retaliation. 
Those opposed to NMD view it as an overpriced, high risk program that has no 
guarantee of achieving its mission and runs the strong risk of setting U.S. arms control 
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back three decades. They believe that the ABM Treaty is quite clear in its prohibition of 
national defense systems and that to amend the treaty to allow for even a limited 
deployment would endanger international strategic stability. Destruction of the ABM 
Treaty would undermine the confidence of US. allies, sabotage non-proliferation efforts, 
and would make other nuclear powers less willing to enter into future nuclear reduction 
agreements. 
D. SUPPORTERS OF A DEPLOYMENT DECISION DELAY 
As the Clinton administration’s self-imposed deadline looms closer, advocates 
and opponents of NMD have begun to ask for a delay in its deployment. Both groups cite 
technology problems with the interceptors, lack of allies’ support, arms control issues, 
and deficiencies in overall system capabilities as reasons to postpone the decision. 
Former government officials President Jimmy Carter, former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger, and former Secretary of Defense William Perry all believe that the NMD 
decision should be delayed. A bipartisan effort within the Congress to delay the NMD 
deployment also has begun. 
Nebraska Senator Chuck Hagel, an advocate of NMD and a member of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, believes that the NMD deployment decision should not be 
made by the Clinton administration. In an April 16, 2000, letter to the Washington 
Times, Senator Hagel expressed his view that the decision should not be made by the 
Clinton administration and instead should be passed on to the next administration. 
According to Senator Hagel, “there will be dangerous consequences for America and the 
world if we [the United States] rush to meet arbitrary decision deadlines and leave one or 
more of the tracks in~omplete.”’~~ 
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In his letter, Hagel discusses the need for the NMD effort’s “four parallel tracks” 
to all converge at the same point, these tracks being technology, cost, ally support, and 
Russian-American relations. Hagel believes that before a deployment decision should be 
made, NMD technology must be sufficiently developed; a better partnership with 
Congress over deployment and funding decisions should be forged; the concerns and 
suspicions of are allies need to be addressed; and the reasons for pursuing NMD must be 
better explained to the Russians. According to Hagel, these requirements have not been 
met and the Clinton administration cannot achieve them in its time remaining. In his 
letter, Senator Hagel recommends that “the decision be put off until next year,” allowing 
a new administration to decide “on when, how, and what to depl~y.””~ 
Senator Joseph Biden from Delaware, the ranking Democrat on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, has joined Senator Hagel in calling for a deployment 
decision delay. In a March 2000 address to scientists at Stanford University, Senator 
Biden said he did not believe that the North Korean missile threat was sufficient to 
warrant a vastly expensive system that was not technically pr~ven.’~’ He also 
commented that he was concerned that deploying the system without resolving ABM 
Treaty issues would severely upset relations with Russia. Senator Biden, like Senator 
Hagel, is upset that the Congress has not been closely consulted on the deployment 
decision and believes that greater public debate is needed. According to Biden the 
system “is going to cost $30 billion, and there has been no public debate, this [absent 
public debate] doesn’t make sense.”’08 Both Biden and Hagel have concerns with the 
Clinton proposed system and believe that their questions must be answered before the 
system’s deployment is approved. 
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The debate within the United States has centered around four areas: the threat, 
feasibility of technology, arms control, and cost. Based on these factors, President 
Clinton has promised to make a deployment decision by the summer of 2000. A clear 
consensus on whether or not deploy the Clinton system is not apparent. The Clinton 
administration and supporters of its NMD plan believe that their system is the best 
compromise that handles the emerging threat, while at the same time addressing Russian 
fears. Proponents of a more comprehensive system argue that the Clinton system is not 
robust, and will only be effective against today’s threat, not against those likely to emerge 
in the future. Opponents of all forms of NMD argue that none of the deployment 
requirements have been satisfied and that an NMD system would not be an effective use 
of U.S. financial and political capital. Their main argument is that it would set arms 
control back three decades and risk major confrontation with the Russians. 
Undoubtedly, this debate will continue to heat up and remain confrontational until 
a final deployment decision is made. As the United States decides whether or not to 
move forward, U.S.-Russian relations will surely be effected. The level of US.-Russian 
cooperation will play a major part in whether or not the U.S. decides to abrogate the 
ABM Treaty, and whether or not amendments can be made to satisfy both countries’ 
concerns and allow US.  NMD to be deployed. 
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IV. RUSSIAN STRATEGIC VIEWS ON NMD AND THE ABM 
TREATY 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has tenaciously clung to its superpower 
status. This chapter describes the major Russian strategic schools of thought, examines 
Russia’s position on ABM Treaty modification and proposed U.S. National Missile 
Defense, and identifies the strategic tenets of the January 2000 National Security 
Concept. 
A. RUSSIAN STRATEGIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 
1. Traditionalists 
Within Russia there are two competing schools of strategic thinking. The 
traditionalist thinking “calls for the preservation of a strong emphasis on maintaining a 
military strategic balance with the United  state^.""^ Essentially this is the same thinking 
that was present during the Cold War. Traditionalists rely on existing bilateral 
agreements and treaties to maintain the status quo.”’ Those who advocate a strict 
adherence to the ABM Treaty believe that any wavering on NMD would give the United 
States a strategic advantage. This school of strategic thinking continues to base relations 
with the United States on the principle of mutual assured destruction, which demands that 
both sides remain vulnerable to the other’s nuclear attack. In a November 1996 address to 
the Federal Assembly, Russian President Boris Yeltsin supported this school of thought. 
Yeltsin declared that “the Russian Federation is determined to adhere strictly to existing 
and future treaties in strategic offensive weapons and antiballistic missile defense, and it 
is ready to continue further reductions of its nuclear weapons on a bilateral basis with the 
United States, while maintaining the balance of strategic weapons as a guarantee against 
the return to global opposition of forces and the race of arms.””’ In accordance with the 
traditionalist perspective, there exists an inextricable link between offensive and 
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defensive strategic weapons; consequently any move towards reduction of offensive 
weapons can only be done if both sides abide by the provisions of the ABM treaty. 
Allowing the United States to move forward with NMD is viewed by the traditionalists as 
a curtailing of Russia’s offensive capability, thus lessening American vulnerability to 
retaliation. Traditionalists are convinced that the United States is determined to withdraw 
fiom the ABM treaty and move towards acquiring absolute protection fiom enemy 
missile attack. They view even limited U.S. NMD as dangerous to Russian nuclear 
security. 
2. Moderates 
Moderates recognize that the Cold War is over and “the virtual disappearance of 
the threat of American nuclear attack against Russia.”’ l2  Proponents of moderate 
thinking realize that parity is not possible and believe that the balance of forces will 
shift.113 They recommend that Russia strive towards a level of reasonable sufficiency, 
which entails maintaining a force structure that would allow Russia to deliver 
unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike.’ l4 Moderates maintain that Russia should 
“abandon the idea of possessing nuclear potential that would be numerically equal to the 
aggregate potential of all other nuclear powers.’’’ I s  According to Ivan Safachuk, a 
Russian author who has written on post-Cold War disarmament, “the concept of 
[quantitative] parity is irrational, the countervalue strike should be recognized as the only 
possible nuclear strike that Russia may de l i~er .””~  Although their views on nuclear force 
structure differ, the moderates share the same view as the traditionalists on the effects of 
U.S. national missile defense. 
42 
3. Shared View , 
Traditionalists and moderates believe that the United States is masking its true 
goals. Both groups remain perplexed by the Clinton administration’s calls for maintaining 
the ABM Treaty, albeit with revisions, and pursuing development of a system for 
national missile defense against limited attacks. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov 
recently commented “we heard a lot of various contradictory statements on the part of the 
U.S. administration, [we] must clarify the administration’s real approach to the ABM 
Treaty.’,’’’ Russians remain suspicious of the United States plan to deploy a limited 
NMD system based at sites in Alaska and North Dakota that would be able to provide 
protection to all fifty states. They see no difference in the levels of NMD, whether it is a 
limited system to combat a rogue threat or a comprehensive system like SDI. Therefore, 
both traditionalists and moderates view any NMD plan as a violation of the ABM Treaty. 
B. VIEWS ON ABM TREATY MODIF’ICATION AND U.S. NMD 
Russia’s official position on the ABM Treaty is that it is “the cornerstone of 
strategic stability and therefore any attempt to modify it would destroy the foundations of 
U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control.’”’* Although many Russians argue that this has 
always been their position, Pave1 Podvig, a Russian scholar with the Center for A r m s  
Control at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology disagrees. Podvig points out 
that in the first fifteen years of the treaty’s history it was the Soviet Union that pushed the 
envelope of treaty regulations, causing the United States to raise questions repeatedly 
about Soviet compliance with the treaty.”’ It was these problems and questions over 
specific parts of the treaty that caused the two sides to negotiate and sign a number of 
agreed statements that made the treaty easier to understand and enforce. 
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Once Ronald Reagan was elected president and introduced the Strategic Defense 
Initiative in March of 1983, it would be the Soviets who would cry that the treaty’s 
envelope of regulations and restrictions were being stretched. The Americans countered 
and accused the Soviets of a number of treaty violations, including the establishment of 
an early warning radar at Krasnoyarsk.’20 A few years later the first talks of a “broad” 
interpretation of the treaty’s principles and restrictions was proposed by the Americans. 
The Americans suggested both sides be allowed to develop and test systems based on 
“other physical principles” not addressed by the treaty.12’ Prior to the 1980s, the 
Americans had rejected such liberal interpretations of the treaty due to the belief that the 
Soviets had the technical advantage in developing and testing ABM system technology. 
The Soviets rejected the American suggestion of broad interpretation and eventually US.  
officials dropped the idea. 
As the Cold War ended, the United States and the Soviet Union were again 
discussing missile defense and the ABM Treaty. This time both sides were talking about 
cooperation. The United States had shifted its BMD focus from countering a massive 
Soviet ballistic missile threat to dealing with a limited threat posed by rogue nations or an 
accidental Soviet launch. This concern was later reinforced by the events that took place 
during the August 1991 attempted coup in the Soviet Union, when it was confirmed that 
“the authority over strategic forces was unclear for several days.”’22 The Americans 
proposed that both the United States and the Soviet Union cooperate on developing a 
limited global BMD system to counter emerging threats to the security of both countries. 
According to Podvig, “neither the limited nature of the suggested defense system nor the 
call for cooperation was news to the Soviet leader~hip.”’~~ Such proposals had never 
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been taken seriously because the Soviets believed that no defense would ever be limited 
and no U.S. proposal could be taken seriously.’24 This time, however, Soviet President 
Gorbachev broke with the long-standing policy of denying cooperation and agreed to 
discuss possible cooperation on non-nuclear ABM systems. President Gorbachev’s 
decision to explore cooperative BMD efforts, although initially met with skepticism, was 
embraced by several members of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and military. Both groups 
began to wonder what the strategic picture would look like if weapons of mass 
destruction fell into the hands of third world militaries. A statement by Chief of the Main 
Staff of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces Col. Gen. Kochemasov captured the concerns 
of many military officers and diplomats when he asked; “say nuclear missile weapons fall 
into the hands of irresponsible, incompetent people. What then? Any use of such 
weapons could provoke World War 111. That is a terrible 
Even as the Soviet Union collapsed and Russian President Yeltsin replaced Soviet 
President Gorbachev, the new Russian Federation’s position did not change dramatically 
from that of the old regime. In June 1992, President Yeltsin signed a Joint U.S.-Russian 
Statement that gave priority to exploring “possible changes to existing treaties and 
agreements” in order to move forward on joint projects “to explore the role for defenses 
against limited ballistic missiles attacks.”’26 Not long after this statement was signed, 
Russia began to explore the possibility of building a joint system. This plan was seen by 
many in industry as a way to revive the faltering Russian space and technology sector 
while at the same time continuing to improve relations with the West. As the idea 
became feasible, the two sides began to consider making changes to existing treaties to 
make the cooperative effort legal. Although it is doubtful that the Russians would admit it 
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now, it appeared that the ABM treaty would be modified to allow for such systems to be 
tested and deployed. 
The process soon stalled, because the two sides could not agree on a number of 
key issues. Issues like TMD demarcation, NATO expansion, and NATO intervention 
into the former Yugoslavia severely strained U.S.-Russian relations, making cooperation 
almost impossible. As it became apparent to both sides that cooperation on BMD 
systems was unlikely, the United States decided to move forward unilaterally with a 
BMD system capable of providing limited homeland defense. On January 20 1999, the 
Clinton administration announced that it would begin exploring the possibility of 
deploying a limited NMD system. 
Russian government and military officials were quick to voice their concern about 
the U.S. call for ABM Treaty amendments. Both government and military officials have 
said that amending the treaty to allow for the proposed U.S. system would “bring down 
the entire system of strategic stability in the Currently the Russians have 
shown no signs that they are willing to allow any treaty amendments. In a November 
1999 meeting with President Clinton, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin delivered a 
message from the Russian President which warned that a collapse of the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty, resulting from the deployment of a U.S. NMD system, would have 
extremely dangerous consequences for the entire arms control process.’28 The statement 
did not specify exactly what the “extremely dangerous” consequences would be, but went 
on to say that although only a few countries have taken part in the ABM treaty, it 
concerns the security interests of all states. This statement shows the integration of both 
traditionalist and moderate strategic thinking. Obviously the traditionalist would support 
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maintaining status quo arms control policies, which were based on Cold War assumptions 
of Soviet and American nuclear force capabilities. The moderates accept the new 
strategic reality, but point to the destabilizing effects that treaty modifications could have 
on the new multipolar world. The Russian fear is that changes to the treaty would result 
in an offensive versus defensive arms race, not just between the Russians and the 
Americans, but among all nuclear powers. Yeltsin’s letter captured many of the same 
points that were advanced by Marshal Grechko, Soviet Defense Minister in 1972, just 
after the SALT I and ABM Treaty talks were concluded. Grechko wrote that the treaty 
prevented “the emergence of a chain reaction of competition between offensive and 
defensive 
The Yeltsin letter to Clinton conveyed Russia’s toughest message on ABM Treaty 
modification to date. In the past President Yeltsin had shown a willingness to work with 
Americans on missile defense issues by leaving the idea of joint U.S.-Russian 
cooperation of ABM modification and global NMD open for fbture discussion. Even as 
recently as June 1999, when the two Presidents met in Cologne, it appeared that President 
Yeltsin was willing to discuss possible ABM Treaty modification in return for further 
strategic arms reductions. These agreements were outlined in the Joint Statement issued 
concerning strategic offensive and defensive arms, in which the two sides agreed that 
discussions on START I11 and the ABM Treaty would begin later in the summer of 
1 999.l3O 
As President Yeltsin’s willingness to cooperate on ABM issues decreased, the two 
sides soon fell into a deadlock. According to Vladimir Rakhmanin, Russian Foreign 
Ministry spokesman, even though the Russians have agreed to meet with U.S. officials to 
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discuss the situation, “one should not identify Russia’s consent to the holding of such 
discussions with consent to an ‘adaptation’ of the ABM Treaty.”13’ In an October 1999 
address, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov announced “there is no and cannot be any 
bargaining with the Americans over Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense.”’32 The Russians 
fear that the U.S. push for NMD is just another example of how the US.  and NATO are 
attempting to build a one-sided world order. In a March 2000 address to the CIS Council 
of Defense Ministers, Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov commented “there is evidently a 
striving on the part of the USA and its allies in NATO to build a one-sided model serving 
solely their intere~ts.’’’~~ The toughest diplomatic action by Russia to date has been to 
cosponsor and introduce, along with Belarus and China, a resolution to the United 
Nations General Assembly’s First Committee, a committee on disarmament and 
international security. The resolution called for renewed efforts by each of the treaty’s 
parties to preserve and strengthen the treaty through full and strict compliance. It also 
called for the parties to limit the deployment of ABM systems and to refrain from the 
deployment of such systems intended for the defense of its country’s territory. On 
November 5, 1999, by a vote of 54 in favor to 4 against and 73 abstentions, the resolution 
passed. 
According to Alexander Pikayev, a scholar with the Carnegie Moscow Center, the 
reasons for the deadlock on treaty negotiations and overall Russian objection to U.S. 
limited NMD can be explained by a variety of factors. Russian officials are not 
convinced that ABM Treaty modification is needed to handle the “potential and limited 
missile threats” from rogue states such as North Korea.’34 According to Vladimir 
Petrovsky, a member of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, “Nobody has hitherto 
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proved sufficiently, reliably and convincingly that North Korea really does possess 
missile potential and is capable of threatening the United States.”135 This is why the 
military believes that systems already in line with the treaty, like the U.S. Navy’s 
proposed theater wide missile system or the U.S. Army’s THAAD system could be 
deployed to the region to sufficiently handle the “limited threat.” 
Russian officials believed that the 1997 demarcation agreements, which increased 
the allowed speed of theater missile interceptors, was a significant concession that gave 
the Americans “very high ceilings for permitted It even appears that some 
Russians would be willing to allow the United States to explore new TMD systems as an 
alternative to pursuing NMD. In the March 3-16 issue of Nezavisimuye Voyennuye 
Obuzreniye, Vadim Solovyev suggested that the United States invest in systems designed 
to intercept ICBM during the boost phase. According to Solovyev, such a system could 
be “installed on a missile armed aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles patrolling near a 
missile launch, either constantly or in times of Such a plan is similar to what 
the United States Air Force is attempting to accomplish with its Airborne Laser Program. 
The goal is to fit a Boeing 747 with a laser capable of limited BMD. Deployment of this 
system, however, is still several years off. Experts in the United States insist that TMD 
and NMD are two independent missions, each requiring its own platforms. 
The Russian fear is that such concessions will allow the United States to turn a 
robust TMD program into the base of a comprehensive NMD system. There are 
suspicions in Russia that the United States is using the rogue threat as an excuse to begin 
a program that has greater aims in mind.I3* According to US. officials, the current U.S. 
plan for “limited” NMD is designed to face a limited number of warheads from rogue 
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state threats. The February 25-March 01 2000 edition of Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 
Obozreniye disagreed, stating that the plan specifically references the radar capability of 
the proposed new systems, or radar system upgrades, in Great Britain, Greenland, Alaska, 
and North Dakota. They believe that “after modernization, the technical possibilities of 
the system controlling ABM combat activities will be precisely those necessary for a 
missile defense system aimed at Russia and China.”’39 In preparation for such moves by 
the United States, the Russian Military has promised to “respond appropriately” and take 
measures to commensurate with the situation taking shape.140 
Supreme Commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General 
Vladimir Yakovlev, announced in an October 5, 1999, press conference that in “purely 
military terms” Russia will take “countermeasures” against any NMD system that the 
United States might deploy. Yakovlev also stated that “two dozen measures are under 
consideration, which Russia can put into practice without significantly increasing 
 expenditure^."'^' Perhaps one such response was demonstrated by Russia’s November 2, 
1999, testing of a short-range interceptor missile fired from the Russian Sary-Shagan 
range, which is located on the temtory of Kazakhstan. The test missile was among those 
installed in the Moscow ABM system, built around the capital in the Soviet era and 
allowed by the ABM Treaty. The missile test firing has been the only definitive military 
action that has been reported to date. 
Russian domestic politics also complicates negotiations with the United States 
over revising the ABM Treaty. In his February 2000 “Program on New Approaches to 
Russian Security” Policy Memo, Pikayev pointed out that in the past, US.-Russian 
deadlocks over bilateral agreements would have been solved during summits. This was 
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no longer possible because the strain on U.S.-Russian relations has prevented Presidents 
Clinton and Yeltsin from building on their strong friendship and record for compromise. 
Domestic scandals that linked Yeltsin’s regime to money laundering by western banks, 
disagreement over NATO involvement in Kosovo, and western criticism of the Russian 
campaign in Chechnya have caused Yeltsin to become increasingly anti-Westem.l4* 
Pikayev asserts that the early resignation of Yeltsin “deprived Washington of a 
Russian leader firmly committed to cooperation with the West.”’43 He fiuther asserts that 
it is not surprising that Vladimir Putin, Yeltsin’s chosen successor, has chosen to 
disassociate himself from the pro-western policy of the early Yeltsin administration.144 It 
is not appropriate to classify Putin’s first weeks and months as President as “anti- 
Western,” but rather it is more appropriate to call his policies “not as pro-Western” than 
those of his predecessor. He has allowed the military greater influence over arms control 
issues and aggressively carried out the war in Chechnya despite strong western criticism, 
but has been careful not to make any promises regarding AJ3M Treaty modification. It is 
not clear whether these actions are part of a larger “Putin plan” or whether they are 
simply part of election politics. Many have viewed this change as a purely political move 
aimed at influencing Duma and presidential politics, so that supporters of the regime 
would be successful. What is clear is that Vladimir Putin’s “not as pro-Western” actions 
have captured popular sentiment regarding ABM/NMD issues. 
Members of the Russian State Duma have also expressed their concern with U.S. 
actions that point towards future NMD deployment. Roman Popkovich, former head of 
the State Duma Defense committee, agrees with plans to respond militarily if the U.S. 
deploys an NMD system. In October 1999, Mr. Popkovich told a Russian news agency 
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that “Russia should develop totally new offensive weapons and means to get the better of 
the U.S. anti-missile defense in order to reach The new head of the Defense 
Committee has taken a more moderate tone than that of his predecessor. In a March 2000 
defense committee document, Andrey Nikolayev put forward an initiative to establish 
closer cooperation between the Russian Federal Assembly, including the State Duma, and 
the U.S. Congress.’46 While encouraging exchange programs so that legislators could 
better understand the others position on important international issues, the chairman also 
noted that any violation of the ABM Treaty was unacceptable to Russia. He added 
further that if the United States implements its proposed NMD, a whole set of agreements 
aimed at ensuring international security would be je0pardi~ed.I~~ 
Former Chairman of the Russian Duma Committee for International Affairs 
Vladimir Lukin is of the opinion that if the United States withdraws from the ABM 
Treaty, Russia will have to increase spending to perfect the system of dealing with anti- 
missile defense. According to Lukin, if Russia does not succeed in preventing the United 
States from deploying its limited NMD system, Russia “will have to respond 
asymmetri~ally.”’~~ The Duma’s Communist Party faction also was upset over calls by 
the United States to amend the ABM Treaty. In a statement released on October 6, 
1999,the Communists stated that attempts by the United States to amend the ABM Treaty 
“will not remain unanswered in Russia.” Most of the rhetoric from Duma members came 
just prior to the December 1999 State Duma election and there has been considerably less 
talk reported in both the American and Russian press since the conclusion of the 
campaign. 
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Although the new millenium brought Russia a new president, in the early months 
of 2000 the U.S. and Russia appeared no closer to compromise, even though overall 
relations did appear to be mending. After concluding talks with American Secretary of 
State Madeline Albright, Foreign Minister Ivanov repeated the Russian position on ABM 
treaty modification. He remarked that “we have been telling our American partners that 
the modification of the ABM treaty might undermine the agreement. ..we are sure that we 
together could find other answers to those threats from third countries.” After this 
statement, and a number of other similar ones made by military and Foreign Ministry 
personnel, several conflicting reports began to surface in both the Russian and American 
media speculating on the possibility of an agreement on AI3M Treaty modifications. 
One such story was run in the Russia Journa2, an online weekly that tracks 
Russian social and political stones of interest. The story, released on March 03 2000, 
reported that Acting Russian President Vladimir Putin wanted to send a message to the 
West that “it is possible to reach agreement with him even on the thorniest security 
issues.’7149 According to the article this was the reason for Russian Security Council 
Secretary Sergei Ivanov’s late February 2000 visit to Washington. Alexander Golts 
reported that Secretary Ivanov “brought up the controversial ABM Treaty issue and made 
it clear that Moscow was ready to consider a compromise so l~ t ion . ” ’~~  The following 
day the Rueters News Agency reported that Russia had announced that “it had ruled out 
any discussions on changing the ABM Treaty.77151 
Within Russia there have been a few signs that moderate thinking is beginning to 
take hold. Within the Russian press there have been a few articles by experts and scholars 
either calling for compromise or hinting that compromise is possible. Russian 
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academician V. N. Tsygichko, of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, and A. A. 
Piontkovskiy, director of the Center for strategic Studies of Russian Academy of 
Sciences, believe that Russia has a lot to gain by cooperating with the United States on 
ABM Treaty and NMD issues. Their thinking seems to be in line with that of policy- 
makers of the early nineties, who were supportive of the U S .  proposed GPALS effort. 
According to their December 1999 article in Voyennaya Mysl, “a line towards 
consultations and constructive cooperation in creating a limited missile defense is 
enormously more promising and is in the interests of Russia’s National Security.”l5’ The 
article addresses many of Russia’s concerns and concludes that in the end ABM Treaty 
modifications will not be destabilizing. In fact, the two view the possible changes as 
adding to Russian strategic stability. They believe that even with limited NMD 
capabilities, the theory of “MAD-stability” will remain the dominant strategic paradigm 
and that, through cooperation and the sharing of technology, Russia would be able to 
counter many of its own rogue threats. The article goes on to discuss specific verification 
processes and technology transfer policies that could make this idea possible. Such 
thinking is not widely popular in Russia and represents the views of only a small group of 
scientific and strategic thinkers. 
C. RUSSIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT 
Russia’s January 2000 national security blueprint entitled “Concept of National 
Security” is a document that lays out Russia’s “views on ensuring the security of the 
individual, society, and the state from external and internal threats in all spheres of life in 
the Russian Federati~n.””~ The concept paper outlines Russia’s place in the world, 
Russian national interests, threats to national security, and basic tasks in ensuring national 
security. Due to Russia’s current economic situation, many stated polices can not be 
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implemented. The interests and national concerns outlined in the concept help to better 
explain many of the ABM Treaty and NMD questions that the United States and Russia 
have yet to resolve and that have been discussed in the sections above. 
The Russian concept paper states that there are two trends dominating 
international relations. The first is a move towards a true multilateral international 
system in which there has been a “strengthening of economic and political positions of a 
considerable number of states and their integration  association^."'^^ The second trend is 
a move by the United States and other Western countries to create a structure of 
international relations based on domination and set on the use of military force to provide 
unilateral solutions to key global political problems in violation of international law.155 
Russia states very clearly that it supgorts the first trend and will “facilitate the 
development of an ideology of the creation of a multipolar world.”156 Russia’s view of 
the world community clearly demonstrates a combination of both traditionalist and 
moderate thinking. Russia’s endorsement of the first trend, a trend of multilaterlism, 
shows Russia’s acknowledgment of its new diminished role in the international system. It 
is doubtful that the moderates are overly pleased with Russia’s new role, nevertheless, 
they accept it and, as mentioned above, believe that future plans should be based on that 
reality. The second trend is closer to traditionalist thinking. Traditionalists are more 
likely to be concerned with U.S. and NATO dominance and still look at the West as their 
main competitor. Both groups of thinkers have found fault with the United States push 
for limited NMD. 
The second and third chapters of the concept outline Russia’s national interests, as 
well as threats to those interests. It is vital for Russia to ensure its sovereignty and 
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reinforce “the position of Russia as a great power and one of the influential centers of the 
multipolar w~rld.’’’~’ Russia views the trend of the United States and NATO to attempt 
to create a unilateral structure of international political and military relations as a threat to 
their international interests. Many of the same points made concerning Russia’s world- 
view apgly to Russia’s international interests and perceived threats. The moderates are 
more accepting of the changes that have lead the world towards multilateralism, but when 
threatened tend to side with the traditionalists, who still believe that Russia must remain 
a great power and should repel western influence in the Russian “near abroad.’’ It is easy 
to see why on ABM Treaty and NMD issues, both groups support the status quo. To both 
groups, a United States that is invulnerable to enemy ballistic missile attack, jeopardizes 
moves toward multilateral relations and potentially jeopardizes Russia’s role as a great 
power. 
From the purely strategic standpoint, both traditionalist and moderates worry that 
a future U.S. NMD system could deny Russia an appropriate first or second strike 
capability and therefore deny them the ability to prevent military aggression. Although 
moderates like V. N. Tsygichko and A. A. Piontkovskiy might argue that by viewing 
NATO as Russia’s main threat and not cooperating with the United States on NMD 
issues, they are missing the opportunity to share NMD technology. By not taking 
advantage of such technology, Russia would be limiting its ability to protect itself against 
its own limited ballistic missile threats. As long as Russia bases its strategy and doctrine 
on the traditional Cold War idea of repelling Western aggression, it is not likely to view 
ABM Treaty modifications and limited NMD in a positive light. But if the full scope of 
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threats to Russia were considered, U.S.-Russian cooperation on NMD might fit in line 
with Russia’s stated interests 
U.S. requests to amend the ABM Treaty and possible NMD deployment have 
gotten Russia’s attention. It appears as though the entire Russian leadership is 
demanding that the status quo security arrangement is maintained and ABM Treaty 
remains unchanged. As sour a pill as it may be to swallow, the Russians must accept that 
the United States does have the upper hand. At some point the Russians need to get past 
all of the anti-Western and “we want remain a global superpower” rhetoric and decide if 
there is something to gain out of a possible compromise. The wise and prudent move 
would be to protect the chance for future strategic arms reduction so that they can reliably 
count on their nuclear arsenal as a means of receiving international power and prestige 
until they are able to make needed political, economic, and social reforms. Calls for 
military action or asymmetric responses make good sound bytes for politicians who want 
to seem tough on U.S. NMD during election time and who are continuing to balk at the 
negotiating table, but will only work for so long. Russia runs the risk of a possible United 
States withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and NMD negotiation process. It would appear 
that a more prudent strategy for the Russians would be to cut themselves a favorable deal 
on possible NMD cooperation, inspection rights, and terms for future strategic arms 
reduction treaties. If such an opportunity is missed and Russia makes use of its limited 
assets to act on its threats and respond militarily, then many of the Russian policy makers 
will be correct and an entire system of arms control agreements could be effected. Even 
though many experts believe that the Russian economy could not sustain the military 
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expenditures needed to develop decoys or to restart the “missile works,” the mere threat 
jeopardizes current and future arms reduction treaties. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR START 
When the debate about whether or not the United States and Russia could agree 
on amendments to the ABM Treaty first took shape, it appeared that only the delayed fate 
of START I1 and the fate of future START agreements were relative to the debate. But 
in light of the souring of U.S.-Russian relations following Operation “Desert Fox” and 
the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo, the fate of START agreements are uncertain. 
Recent statements by Russian political and military figures have now called into question 
Russia’s intention to abide by the agreements codified in START I. 
A. START1 
The principal objective in strategic arms control is to increase stability at 
significantly lower levels of nuclear weapons. START I was an equitable and effectively 
verifiable agreement that reduced the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 
warheads. Overall strategic nuclear forces were to be reduced by 30-40 percent, with a 
reduction of as much as 50 percent in the most threatening systems, a total of over 9,000 
warheads. START I required reductions in strategic offensive arms to equal aggregate 
levels, from a high of some 10,500 in each arsenal. The Treaty’s central limits include: 
1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, 6,000 accountable warheads, 4,900 ballistic 
missile warheads, 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy ICBM’s, and 1,100 warheads on mobile 
ICBM’s.158 While the Treaty calls for these reductions to be carried out over seven years, 
in practice all the Lisbon Protocol signatories have already been deactivating and 
eliminating systems covered by the agreement. By June 2000, the full implementation of 
the START I Treaty had not yet been achieved. 
According to reports published in the March 1999 Arms Control Today, the 
Russians have been moving towards START I codified reductions over the last nine 
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years.’59 Calls by Russian officials to take symmetrical retaliatory measures and to 
“remove restrictions under the START treaties” in response to U.S. proposals to amend 
the ABM Treaty and move forward with limited NMD, jeopardizes hture reduction 
progress and the utility of the START I agreement. Russian General Yakovlev is among 
the many Russian leaders who have threatened that if the U.S. abrogates the ABM 
I 
i Treaty, Russia will abandon the START process.’60 In discussing possible 
“countermeasures” that Russia could take in response to an American NMD, General , I 
Yakolev was quoted by Interfax News Agency as saying, “the Topol missile complex has l 
a number of possibilities currently limited by understandings linked with START I. We 
can abandon these limitations and change Topol both in the sphere of ABM penetration 
and in its missiles combat possibilities.”’6’ 
If the Russians decide to move ahead with such countermeasures, START will be 
hrther complicated. Aside from the START I problems caused by the proposed Russian 
“countermeasures” to U.S. NMD, in a interview conducted in January 1999, Russian 
officials accused the U.S. of “noncompliance with certain provisions of the START I 
Treaty.”162 The result of both situations is that unless an NMD/ABM Treaty compromise 
is reached or relations are mended, START I reductions might be in jeopardy of either 
falling farther behind or not being carried out at all. Such results would hrther hinder the 
chances of START I1 reductions actually being implemented and the negotiation of future 
START agreements. 
B. START11 
The START I1 Treaty was negotiated by the United States and Russia between 
1991 and 1992 and submitted to the United States Senate by President George Bush 
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following signature on January 3, 1993. The treaty states, that by December 31, 2007, 
both the United States and Russia are to deploy no more than 3000 to 3500 strategic 
nuclear warheads on ICBM’s, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. START XI builds upon 
START I and provides that all START I provisions will pertain, except as explicitly 
modified in the new treaty. The treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1996, but was 
not approved by the Russian State Duma until April 2000. 
The START I1 issue had been a controversial one for Russian lawmakers. 
Because of domestic political disputes between the executive and legislative branches, 
and international disputes with the United States and NATO, it took the Russian State 
Duma more than seven years to ratify the treaty. Several times in recent years the Duma 
appeared to be close to ratifying the agreement, but because of their objections to the 
U.S.-led Operation Desert Fox in Iraq, NATO actions in Kosovo, and western criticism 
over Russian operations in Chechnya, the Duma postponed the treaty’s ratification. The 
Communists and their hard-line allies, who dominated the parliament prior to the 
December 1999 elections, repeatedly rejected the START I1 treaty, further irritating US.- 
Russian relations. During the late summer and early autumn months of 1999, even in 
light of the fact that post-Kosovo U.S.-Russian relations appeared to be on the mend, 
START 11 ratification was again sidetracked. 
As a result of U.S. NMD efforts, the fate of not only the ABM Treaty became 
questioned, but so too did that of START 11. Because of the fallout over U.S. NMD, 
some Russian scholars, who had previously criticized law makers for delaying START I1 
ratification, began to call for its continued postponement as a means of countering U.S. 
NMD advances. A February 2000 article in the Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta summed 
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up some of the Russian arguments against ratifying START 11. First the article pointed 
out that the treaty was negotiated and signed during a different era in U.S.-Russian 
relations. It pointed to current disputes over “NATO expansion, Kosovo, Iraq, Iran, the 
Caspian pipelines, [and] arms control,” and questioned whether or not U.S.-Russian 
relations have changed too dramatically for both countries to still, as Secretary of State 
Madeline Albright was quoted, “have enough common interests to overcome our 
differences and to work together.”’63 The author, Sergey Rogov, believed that Russia 
should have held off on START I1 ratification until after the Clinton administration had 
announced its intentions on U.S. NMD and ABM Treaty modifications. Rogov was 
womed that if Russia ratified START I1 and the United States decided to move ahead 
with its NMD/ABM Treaty plans, Russia could find itself “either admitting it was 
bluffing and publicly capitulating or else embarking on a fierce confrontation with the 
United According to Rogov, in the later instance “the entire regime of 
strategic arms control will collapse” and, any hope of better relations in the future will 
vanish. 
Russian Scholar Pave1 Podvig has written also about the possibilities that would 
be ahead for Russia if it did not ratify START 11, or if it was forced to break from the 
START agreements because of a U.S. abrogation of the ABM treaty. According to 
Podvig it is “quite likely” that the United States will deploy an NMD ~ystem.’~’ He 
believed that Russia seemed resolved to counter such a decision with “adequate 
measures,” principally suspending strategic arms reductions at the START I 
This possibility was considered during the START I1 ratification debate, but was 
generally discounted as unrealistic, since Russian strategic forces will mostly have 
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declined to levels much lower than those of START I. Russia currently has plans in the 
works to modernize and expand several of its nuclear delivery systems, including the S S -  
27 Topol-M single warhead ICBM, a new submarine launched ballistic missile to replace 
the R-39UTTH, and plans to negotiate the purchase of Tu-95 MS and Tu-160 bombers 
built in the Ukraine.167 Although these plans may sound impressive, according to 
Podvig, Russia will still not be able to match U.S. strategic forces under START I and 
START 11 restrictions. Podvig optimistically estimated that the number of strategic 
warheads that Russia could deploy in 2008 is about 1300, on 300 Topol M ICBM’s, 
seven Delta IV submarines, and about 80 bombers. 168 
According to Podvig, if START I1 had not been ratified or Russia decides not 
follow certain provisions of the treaty, the situation would be different. Even though 
many of these missiles would reach the end of their service life by 2005, he believes that 
there would be enough exceptions to allow Russia “to sustain its land based missile force 
at levels higher than those allowed by the START I1 Treaty.”’69 Podvig’s analysis shows 
that although the set of options available to Russia is limited by its difficult economic 
conditions, it could keep its forces at the level of about 3000 warheads if it decided to 
keep its MIRVed land-based missile force. Contradicting Podvig’s analysis are reports 
printed in the early months of 2000, by the western print media. According to many of 
these reports, leaks from U.S.-Russian discussions of possible START I11 numbers 
estimate the total number of warheads that Russia could maintain closer to 800 instead of 
1300.170 The articles also point out that Russia’s economic future will determine the total 
number of warheads it could maintain, not any arm control agreement. Even if Podvig’s 
numbers are overly optimistic and Russia has already agreed to and formally ratified the 
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START I1 Treaty, his analysis could become relevant if the United States abrogates the 
ABM Treaty and Russia decides that arms control has indeed collapsed. 
Even though many Russians were uneasy about START 11, the Russian 
government insisted that the treaty be ratified. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who 
has received both credit and blame for pushing START I1 ratification to forefront of the 
State Duma’s legislative agenda, has stated that ratification of the treaty was necessary 
because Russia aims “to free the world of the stockpiles of surplus At the 
same time the Russian President stated Russia’s intention to “preserve and strengthen the 
nuclear weapons complex of Russia and that the government wants to increase the 
country’s nuclear security and the reliability of its nuclear shield.”172 A number of 
Russian officials have reiterated Putin’s call to press forward on arms control. 
I 
According to Poytr Romashkin, Assistant to the Deputy Chair of the State Duma 
Defense Committee, there were four main reasons why the START I1 ratification was 
moved up from its original June 2000 legislative calendar date. First, in light of the 
world opinion concerning how Russia handled western criticism during the most recent 
Chechnya crisis, the new Russian President wants “to show the world public opinion that 
Russia is able to carry on further negotiations with the Second, Romashkin 
believes that the treaty’s ratification is being used as an attempt to prevent the United 
States from abrogating the ABM Treaty and moving forward with its proposed limited 
NMD. Russia’s ratification of START I1 would “make the United States responsible for 
violation of strategic stability in the eyes of the world community,” and in essence allow 
Russia to take the strategic moral high ground if a larger dispute over U.S. NMD 
manifests itself later.’74 In the eyes of the world community, Russia will no longer be 
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viewed as the party that disrupted strategic stability, even though it took seven years to 
ratify the treaty. Third, with START I1 ratified, Russia will be able to better influence the 
United States at the NMD/ABM Treaty negotiating table. The Putin administration 
believes that when trying to link future START negotiations to basic provisions of the 
ABM Treaty or when trying to negotiate the deployment of MIRVed land based ICBM’s, 
the United States would be more receptive to Russian requests if START I1 was 
ratified. * 75 Finally, Romashkin believes that Putin and his supporters pushed START I1 
to the forefront because they want to support U.S. President Bill Clinton’s endorsement 
of Vice President A1 Gore in the upcoming US. elections. It is believed that if Clinton is 
seen an international peacekeeper, “who promotes strategic stability,” that image will be 
inherited by Gore and help him win in the November election. 
By ratifying the START I1 Treaty, Russia has placed itself in an interesting 
position by prohibiting the Americans from using START I1 as a bargaining tool for 
concessions on NMD/ABM Treaty issues. As mentioned by the Romashkin article, if the 
United States decides not to negotiate START 111, abrogates the AI3M Treaty, or does not 
ratify the 1997 Demarcation agreements, the Russians would appear to have the high 
ground when appealing to international public opinion. The Russians have not hidden 
their distaste for the START I1 numbers, nor their desire to move immediately into 
START I11 negotiations. President Putin’s move to advance START I1 on the Duma 
legislative calendar and the strong effort made by many Russian officials to get the 
ratification legislation passed, despite healthy opposition, only gives the Russian leader a 
stronger leg to stand on when negotiating START I11 and resisting Al3M Treaty 
modifications. 
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Had the Russian State Duma continued to stall START I1 ratification, the U.S. 
NMDIABM Treaty modification issue would have a great effect on its ratification 
chances. Now that the treaty has been ratified, the effects that the U.S. NMD debate will 
have on the treaty, from a Russian standpoint, have been significantly reduced. There is 
still a chance that if the United States abrogates the ABM Treaty and moves ahead with 
its limited NMD, against the wishes of Russia; the START process could be in jeopardy. 
But with the treaty already being ratified, in essence the Russians have left the fbture of 
the START and strategic arms control up to the Americans. The Americans would have 
been better served in their NMD/ABM Treaty hopes if the Russians would not have 
ratified START 11, thus giving the Americans more leverage when using future START 
agreements as a negotiating tool in fbture NMD/ABM Treaty talks. 
C. FUTURE START AGREEMENTS 
The Clinton administration’s approach has been to link the ABM Treaty/NMD 
issue to fiture START negotiations. It had indicated that it would not submit the 
September 1997 ABM Treaty agreements to the U.S. Senate, nor would the United States 
begin formal START I11 negotiations, until the Russians had ratified START 11. The 
Americans’ hope is that the Russians will allow the United States to move forward with 
NMD if future nuclear force reductions are codified in START 111. This would allow the 
Russians to slim down an already aging arsenal, while at the same time keeping parity 
with the United States and remaining a nuclear superpower. Currently it is not known 
what the exact warhead limitations would be under START 111. The United States and 
Russia have disagreed about how deep the cuts should be. The United States has called 
for cutting arsenals to 2000 to 2500 warheads each, while Russian officials have said they 
are prepared to go to 1500 or even lower. 176 
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As displayed in the June 1999 U.S.-Russia Joint Statement and in subsequent 
meetings during the summer of 1999, the Russians are willing to have discussions with 
Americans on NMD/ABM Treaty and START issues. Currently, the two sides continue 
to meet at the expert or technical level in Geneva to decide on the future treaty’s exact 
numbers. The Russians have maintained, however, that if the ABM Treaty was violated, 
all negotiations on strategic offensive arms would “lose any sense.” According to 
statements made by Foreign Minister Ivanov it is from these positions that the Russian 
side has discussed and will discuss matters connected with a START 111 Treaty. 
Although the START I1 Treaty has been ratified by both countries respective 
legislatures, and it appears that START I11 discussions will give way to formal 
negotiations, this might not be the end of the START debate. Republican Senator and 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms has vowed to block 
I 
approval of any arms agreement that the Clinton administration might bring before the 
Senate. Senator Helms has been especially adamant on the missile defense issue and has 
vowed to thwart any agreement to alter the ABM Treaty. This could spell real trouble for 
the 1997 Demarcation Agreements that are expected to be given to the Senate now that 
Russia has ratified START 11. In an April 26,2000, speech, apparently intended to send 
a message to the President, the senator said “lets be clear to avoid any misunderstanding 
down the line ...any modified ABM Treaty negotiated by this administration will be 
DOA, dead on arrival, at the Senate Foreign Relations Co~nrni t tee .~”~~ The Senator 
added that for the remainder of this year, his committee, “will not consider any new, last- 
minute anns control measure that this administration negotiates in its final, closing 
1 months in office.’7178 It also was announced that the committee would not consider any 
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treaty that binds the new administration to the visions of the Clinton administration. 
According to Senator Helms, “the Russian government should not be under any illusion 
whatsoever that any commitments made by this lame-duck administration will be binding 
on the next admini~tration.””~ Jon Wolfsthal, an arms control specialist with the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace believes that Senator Helms comments 
highlight the wide disagreements that exist on the issue of NMD and arms control. 
Wolfsthal believes that “any deal that the Clinton administration might be able to 
negotiate with Russia would be unacceptable to this Senate, and any deal that the Senate 
would like would be rejected by the Russians.’718o 
In light of Senator Helm’s comments, which represent the sentiments of many of 
his Senate Republican colleagues, negotiating a settlement to the NMD/ABM Treaty 
issue and START I11 is going to be very difficult. Prior to the Senate’s rejection of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and its hawkish attitude towards arms control, it appeared that 
the administration would have some leverage to use START issues as a negotiating tool 
in U.S.-Russian discussions concerning NMD and ABM Treaty modifications. The two 
sides have different expectations as to what exact limitations START I11 should impose 
on the number of allowed warheads. The United States might possibly have compromised 
on its requests for a limitation of 2500 to 2000 warheads and lower the number to the 
Russian requested 1500 to 1000 warheads, in return for Russian cooperation on 
NMD/ABM Treaty issues. 
It is difficult to be optimistic about the chances of compromise on both U.S. NMD 
and START 111. Russia’s position, which has been thoroughly reported in both the 
Russian and western media, contradicts the assertion of the Clinton administration that 
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the NMD/ABM Treaty issue can be linked to START 111. Unless one side alters its 
position greatly, its does not appear that there can be compromise on both issues. 
Perhaps if the Clinton administration were negotiating with the support of the 
Republican-led Senate, the chances for compromise would be greatly improved. But as 
long as the Russians know that any Clinton-led compromise on either issue is likely to be 
voted down by the Republican led Senate, there is no reason for them to change their 
position and compromise. In the weeks leading up to and following the START 11 
ratification, the comments of Russian officials were very clear. With START I1 ratified, 
the responsibility of continuing the trend of bilateral cooperation on anns control has 
been shifted to the United States. According to many Russian officials, if the United 
States insists on pushing its limited NMD and calls for ABM treaty modification, it will 
be to blame for the collapse of the START process. Such a possibility makes those 
advocating for a delay in the US. NMD deployment decision appear more rational if both 
NMD and continued bilateral arms control with the Russians are a national priority. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
It does not seem likely that the United States and Russia will be able to 
compromise on limited national missile defense. The Clinton administration’s attempt to 
link the two issues of U.S. NMD and future arms control agreements has not yielded the 
results for which they had hoped. The Russians do not appear willing to agree to ABM 
Treaty modifications that would allow the United States to move ahead with its defensive 
system in retum for more favorable START I11 terms. They also have stated that if the 
United States abrogates the treaty, the foundation for all current and future arms control 
agreements will be lost. Russian political and military leaders have threatened to answer 
the U.S. system with countermeasures and increased military capability. Even though, 
based on Russia’s current economic crisis, significant military buildup is unlikely, its 
threat has captured the attention of U.S. policy makers and made the fate of current and 
future anns control agreements part of the domestic NMD debate. Under current 
conditions, the advancement of U.S. NMD and a future arms control agreement are not 
compatible. 
The United States must clarify its priorities. The United States must choose what 
it values more, protection against rogue state ballistic missile threats provided by a 
limited national missile defense, or the added security that bilateral arms control 
agreements provide against worldwide nuclear war. It is certainly understandable why 
both American and Russian policy makers would be reluctant to cast aside the many 
years of progress and compromise arms control embodies. The question that one must 
ask is this: “Is the added security provided by a limited national missile defense worth 
possibly jeopardizing the security that current and future arms control treaties provide?” 
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If the Cold War really is over, why is Cold War thinking on arms control and 
bilateral relationships still the driving factor behind this debate? According to the same 
policy makers who argue that the cornerstone of strategic stability, the 1972 ABM 
Treaty, must not be changed at the risk of the collapse of the arms control regime, the 
United States and Russia are no longer adversaries. The reality of the matter is that the 
Soviet Union collapsed and Russia has struggled to pick up the pieces of the Soviet 
I 
Empire, and, aside from nuclear weapons, is no longer able to compete with the United 
States. This fact, along with the belief that the two sides are no longer mortal enemies 
struggling to eradicate the other’s ideology from the face of the earth, begs the question, 
“Why do they need to maintain the status quo arm control regime?” Typically, allies or 
“non-enemies,” depending on your point of view concerning post-Cold War U.S.-Russian 
relations, don’t need bilateral agreements that limit or reduce their weaponry to prevent 
them from going to nuclear war. 
Because of the economic problems that Russia has faced since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, their main deterrent against outside incursion is their nuclear arsenal. 
Because of the current condition of the Russian nuclear force and the economic 
commitment it will require to modernize and maintain, it makes great sense for the 
Russians to want both sides to reduce their authorized numbers through another START 
agreement. For many of the same reasons, it also makes sense for the United States to go 
along with Russian requests and reduce its nuclear forces. What does not make sense is 
that the new number of allowed warheads under a future START I11 agreement, which 
has been speculated and even leaked to the American press, is based more on Russian 
capabilities than American. 
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Such a plan has become possible because of the Clinton administration’s desire to 
link START I11 negotiations to the NMD/ABM Treaty debate. Many supporters of 
NMD, but critics of the Clinton administration’s policy, have argued that under such a 
linkage the United States would be leaving its fate against rogue state missiles up to the 
Russians. The administration’s argument that arms control is too important to throw 
away does indeed have validity, but any new arms control agreement should represent the 
post-Cold War global security reality. If the intent of the administration and the arms 
control community is to maintain a bilateral treaty relationship with the Russians to 
prevent a new arms race, its should not be done at the expense of national security. Any 
new arms control agreement should take into account that the Russians don’t have the 
economic capability to engage in an arms race and should be based on the premise that 
U.S. strategic weapons, or defenses for that matter, would not be focused on the Russian 
Federation. 
New agreements should focus their efforts on better inspection and confidence 
building programs that are designed to demonstrate each side’s capabilities to ease 
tensions and fears, rather than on past ideological assumptions. Both sides should work 
to modernize older command and control systems and prevent the spread of nuclear and 
delivery system technology from hitting the open market and falling into the hands of 
rogue states. Well-developed and explicitly defined verification processes that cover 
offensive and defensive systems should be a major part of any new agreement. This new 
type of agreement would allow both sides the needed flexibility to carryout a national 
defense policy free of outdated bilateral restraints, while at the same time providing a 
better regime to monitor each others offensive and defensive nuclear systems. A regime 
, 
73 
based on verification and confidence building, rather than warhead counting and 
limitation of technological growth, will better allow for technology and capability to keep 
pace with hture threats. 
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